SUCCESS
AND FAILURE OF COMMUNAL RELIGIOUS SECTS
Given
the fact that communal religious sects offer a unique opportunity to
study the rise, operation, and frequently the demise of small
societies, it is surprising that so little research is done in the
area. While the material contained herein may say something about
such sects, it is hoped that the lessons learned from them will have
applications extending beyond the groups treated in this analysis,
especially in the realm of commitment.
DEFINITION
OF THE PROBLEM
We
must recognize from the outset that there are significant problems
associated with the simple definition of the object of our studies.
What do we mean when we speak of a "sect," especially a
"communal sect?" The oldest and most widely known
definition of "sect" is probably that of Ernst Troeltsch,
who perceived the "sect" as, in contrast to the "church,"
a religious organization founded on individualism, voluntarism,
intimate "subjective fellowship" or group identity,
asceticism, and totalitarianism; they were "lay elite,"
"egalitarian, radical and an expression of the depressed
condition of the underprivileged groups" (Wilson, 1970: 22-3;
Whitworth, 1975:3).
Most of these characteristics can be found in the groups we wish to analyze, but others have criticized Troeltsch's church/sect dichotomy as being limited to the European experience. Wilson (1970:24-5) asserts that the phenomenon of American "denominations" defy Troeltsch's ideal types because they mix the opposed qualities, and in industrialized nations generally, sectarianism need not only appear among the lower classes. Benton Johnson makes an insightful distinction between churches and sects when he notes that they differ in their "process of justification," or "salvation:" churches rely on sacraments or "liturgical" means of justification, while sects stress their ethical code or principles as a means of salvation (1957:90). Elmer Clark (1937: 24-5) cites Niebuhr's criteria, among them a unique or peculiar ideology or practice/voluntary membership, and "narrow dogmatism." John Whitworth prefers a definition of "sect" suggested by Bryan Wilson:
"a voluntaristic, ideologically oriented religious institution which tends towards totalitarianism, and is committed to maintaining a relatively high degree of separation from other religious bodies and from the world in general." (1975:4)
Culling
all these definitions, the chief determinants in distinguishing a
"sect" appear to me to be the higher degree of voluntary
association, the heightened group identity, a conception of members
as a "lay elite," a greater stress on ethical as opposed to
liturgical justification, and a rejection of the prevailing religion
or culture usually associated with a unique religious ideology or
practice.
The
next problem that confronted students of religious sectarianism
concerned the many kinds of sects that abounded. They could be
categorized by "the mental make-up" of their members
(Clark, 1937:25), by responses to the world and conceptions of
salvation (Wilson, 1970:37), and doubtless many other ways. I have
chosen to label the sects that I will study as "Communal"
because they all hold one outstanding feature in common — they all
practiced economic communism, i.e., all property was held in common.
No attempt was made to make this category part of some larger
typology, because the intellectual problem instigating this paper
concerned why some communistic experiments succeeded where others
failed.
The
practice of economic communism was thus the identifying independent
variable and "success" was the dependent variable. Since
history does not readily allow us to test for direct effects, the
alternative was to seek out possible intervening variables, as well.
And, because the problems of secular communes (i.e., things leading
to their demise or success) may differ, it seemed theoretically wiser
to "control" for the variable of "ideology" by
restricting the study to religious sects practicing economic
communism. Thus the conclusions of this exploratory study should,
perhaps, be restricted
to these communal religious sects, as well.
Every
analysis and every explanation begins by taking a certain
perspective, making certain assumptions about reality. The
assumptions that form the foundation of the present analysis are
those generally regarded as the “metatheory" underlying
"exchange" theory.
METATHEORY
That
metatheory was probably most clearly defined by the “classical"
economists and utilitarians, such as Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham.
Anthony Oberschall points out that these philosophers took the
position that "Man was a social animal...aware of and responsive
to his fellow's
"approval and disapproval;" thus it was that:
"Although
each man pursued his own happiness based on a calculus of pleasure
and pain, his drives and dispositions were very much circumscribed by
his moral sense and by sympathy...
he understood and took into account the motives of others, the
probable outcome of their activities, and their power to sanction
him." (1973:6)
1)
humans calculate the costs and benefits involved in a social
transaction with the aim of making a profit;
2)
the calculation of costs and benefits is weighted by the factor of
known alternatives;
3)
economic exchange of goods and services is but a particular case of
the more general phenomenon of social exchange, which includes, for
example, the exchange of sentiments. (1974:
212-3).
Psychological
behaviorism, a close relative to utilitarianism, has also had an
impact on the assumptions of modern "exchange" theory. The
behaviorists assume that humans and other animals "pursue
alternatives that will yield the most reward and least punishment"
(Turner, 1974: 221-2). Modern exchange theorists, says Turner,
prefer the behaviorist notion of “reward" because it
emphasizes psychological motivation, but they choose to use the
concept of "costs" rather than the behaviorist concept of
"punishment" because the latter is not readily associated
with the examination of alternatives (1974:222). Peter Blau combines
first two assumptions above in the statement that "human beings
choose between alternative potential associates or courses of action
by evaluating the experiences or expected experiences with each in
terms of "preferences ranking and then selecting the best
alternative" (Blau, 1964:18). In this he also
combines
what Anthony Heath calls "the theory of riskless choice,"
in which calculations are assumed to entail known and certain
consequences, with the assumption of the "theory of risky
choice," in which individuals are assumed to calculate expected
utilities, because the consequences are not certain (1976:8, 13).
Blau observes as well that "most human pleasures have their
roots in social life "because the gratifications experienced by
individuals are contingent on actions of others;" but at the
same time, the obtaining of a reward from an exchange usually
represents a cost to another party, and rewards or costs of an
exchange need not be shared equally.
Briefly
summarized, the philosophical position of exchange theory, the one to
be assumed in this paper, is as follows:
1)
humans, by choice or necessity, must engage in social interaction;
2)
social interaction of any kind involves the calculation of rewards
and costs (expected rewards and costs under conditions of
uncertainty) relative to alternatives, with the aim of maximizing
profit;
3)
the benefits or costs of interaction need not be equally distributed;
4)
the content of social interaction can include non-material phenomena
(e.g., affection, ideas, values) as well as material.
PROPOSITIONS
On
the basis of the above axioms, a number of theorists have derived
propositions about social reality. The theorists most appropriate to
this study appear to be George Homans, Peter Blau, Randall Collins,
and Lewis Coser.
George
Homans neatly presents his theory in the form of seven propositions:
(1)
"For all actions taken by persons, the more often a particular
action of a person is rewarded, the more likely the person is to
perform that action."
(2)
"If in the past the occurrence of a particular stimulus, or set
of stimuli, has been the occasion on which a person's action has been
rewarded, then the more similar the present stimuli are to the past
ones, the more likely the person is to perform the action, or some
similar action, now."
(3)
"The more valuable to a person is the result of his action, the
more likely he is to perform the action."
(4)
"The more often in the recent past a person has received a
particular reward, the less valuable any further unit of that reward
becomes for him."
(5a)
"When a person's action does not receive the reward he expected,
or receives punishment he did not expect, he will be angry; he
becomes more likely to perform aggressive behavior, and the results
of such behavior
becomes more valuable to him."
(5b)
"When a person's action receives reward he expected, especially
a greater reward than he expected, or does not receive punishment he
expected, he will be pleased; he becomes more likely to perform
approving behavior, and the results of such behavior becomes more
valuable to him."
(6)
"In choosing between alternative actions, a person will choose
that one for which, as perceived by him at the time, the value, V, of
the result, multiplied by the probability, p, of getting the result,
is the greater." (1974:16 22-3,25,29,37,39,43)
It
is important to define some of the major concepts that Homans uses.
Homans defines "rewards" as "results of a person's
actions that have positive values for him," and "punishments"
are "results that have negative ones"(1974:25). Clearly,
the definition of "value" comes to assume the position of
greatest importance, but this is the very instance where he becomes
most ambiguous. First he claims that "value" refers to
"the degree of reward" (Homans, 1974:25), but this makes
the definition of reward and value circular, thus defining neither.
Next he refers to "values" as "things that men find
rewarding," some innate and some culturally acquired (Homans,
1974:27). Unfortunately this does not wholly eliminate, the
redundancy, as both "values" and "reward" become
anything found to be rewarding. To the claim that a tautology exists
when "value" can only be ascertained by the frequency of an
action, he replies (lamely, I think) that such a tautology can be
warranted, and that "values" should be determined
empirically in lower-order hypotheses (Homans, 1974:36). I suspect
that what Homans is trying to say is that rewards must be defined as
rewards and that this definition includes not only what is to be
regarded as rewarding, but how it ranks against other things defined
as rewards (thus the element of "degree"). In this sense a
"value" is that individual or cultural meaning attached to
an objective phenomenon, "reward."
Blau
is not as helpful in delineating his core propositions. Turner
claims to have isolated these seven propositions from Blau's major
work, Exchange and Power in Social Life:
(1)
"The more profit a person expects from another in emitting a
particular activity, the more likely he is to emit that activity."
(2)
"The more a person has exchanged rewards with another, the more
likely are reciprocal obligations to emerge and guide subsequent
exchanges among those persons."
(3)
"The more the reciprocal obligations of an exchange relationship
are violated, the more are deprived parties disposed to sanction
negatively those violating the norm of reciprocity."
(4)
"The more expected rewards have been forthcoming from the
emission of a particular activity, the less valuable the activity,
and the less likely its emission."
(5)
"The more exchange relations have been established, the more
likely they are to be governed by norms of "fair exchange;"
(6)
"The less norms of fairness are realized in exchange, the more
are deprived parties disposed to sanction negatively those violating
the norms."
(7)
"The more stabilized and balanced, some exchange relations among
social units, the more likely other exchange relations are to become
imbalanced and unstable." (1974:267-9)
These
inferred propositions appear to be somewhat accurate reflections of
Blau's thoughts as outlined in the chapter titled "The Structure
of Social Associations" (1964:20-31). There are a number of
visible similarities to Homans' propositions, but there are
noteworthy differences as well. For one, Blau unfortunately spends
little time defining his variables, unlike Homans. Secondly, Blau
gives greater weight (explicitly)
to the role of culture in defining the meaning of an exchange,
especially as to its fairness. (Turner, 1974:268). A third point is
the general difference in perspective that exists between Homans and
Blau: Homans begins with those points of view characteristic of
psychological behaviorism, while Blau assumes the viewpoints more
typical of classical economics.
The
propositions of Randall Collins are most easily identified with the
"Conflict" and "Phenomenological" schools of
thought, but the underlying assumptions have much in common with
those undergirding the theories of Homans and Blau, particularly (a)
the assumption that behavior is self-interested and profit-maximizing
by intent, (b) that non-material
phenomena, such as worldviews, can be items of exchange, and (c) that
exchange need not be equally beneficial to all parties. Collins
specifically postulates that:
(1)
"Each individual constructs his own subjective reality."
(2)
"Individual cognition is constructed from social
communications."
(3)
"Individuals have power over each other's subjective reality."
(4)
"Each individual attempts to maximize his subjective status to
the degree allowed by the resources available to himself and others
he contacts."
(5)
"Each individual values highest what he is best at, and attempts
to act it out and communicate about it as much as possible."
(6)
"Each individual seeks social contacts which give him greatest
subjective status, and avoids those in which he has lowest status."
(7)
"Where individuals' resources differ, social contacts involve
inequalities in power to define subjective reality."
(8)
"Situations in which differential power is exercised,
and withdrawal is not immediately possible, implicitly involve
conflict." (1975:73)
Obviously
these postulates are not stated in the same manner as the
propositions of Homans and Blau, but three things favor their
inclusion: (a) all but the first three postulates could be restated
in the form more typical of propositions; (b) the only alternative
formulations that Collins presents us with are far more substantive,
virtually hypotheses; and (c) they place important emphasis on the
areas of non-material exchange and antagonistic exchange (conflict).
Note that Collins' eighth postulate does not require cultural
standards of fairness to determine "exploitation," a
crucial distinction between his theory and Blau's.
Whereas
Collins suggests propositions concerning the sources of antagonistic
exchange or "conflict," Lewis Coser has rendered several
propositions concerning the consequences of antagonistic exchange:
(1)
"Conflict serves to establish and maintain the identity and
boundary lines of societies and groups." (1956:38)
(2)
"...the expression of hostility in conflict serves positive
functions insofar as it permits the maintenance of relationships
under conditions of stress, thus preventing group dissolution through
the withdrawal of hostile participants." (1956:39).
(3)
"Realistic conflicts arise when men clash in the pursuit of
claims based on frustration of demands and expectations of gains...;"
"Non-realistic conflicts" result from "the need for
tension release of at least one of them." "Whereas the
first type of conflict takes place with the frustrating agents
themselves in expectation of attaining specific results, the second
type consists of... aggressive
action directed against shifting objects." (1956:54,49).
(4)
"Conflict can only occur in the interaction between subject and
object; it always presupposes a relationship." "Aggressive
or hostile impulses do not suffice to account for social
conflict...Realistic conflict need not be accompanied by hostility
and aggressiveness."
(1956:59).
(5)
"The closer the relationship the greater the affective
investment, the greater also the tendency to suppress than express
hostile feelings," yielding "an essential ambivalence."
(1956:62)
(6)
"The
closer the relationship, the more intense the conflict"
(1956:67)
(7)
"Conflict may serve to remove dissociating elements in a
relationship and to reestablish unity" (unless the conflict is
over "the basic assumptions upon which the relation is founded")
(1956:80)
(8)
"The absence of conflict cannot be taken as an index of the
strength and stability of a relationship. Stable relationships may
be characterized by conflicting behavior." (1956:85)
(9)
"Conflict with out groups increases internal cohesion."
"Whether increase in centralization accompanies this increase in
cohesion depends on both the character of the conflict and the type
of group... Despotism seems to be related to lack of cohesion..."
(1956:87,95).
(10)
"Groups engaged in continued struggle with the outside tend to
be intolerant within... Such groups tend to assume a sect-like
character: they select membership in terms of special characteristics
and so tend to be limited in size, and they lay claim to the total
personality involvement of their members... The only way they can
solve the problem of dissent is through the dissenter's voluntary or
forced withdrawal." (For "groups of the church-type,"
more tolerance is possible because they are not in constant
conflict.) (1956:103-4)
(11)
Groups that are "rigidly organized" or which restrict
internal conflict may evoke enemies and thereby strengthen group
solidarity. (1956:110)
(12)
"Conflicts in which the participants feel that they are merely
the representatives of collectivities and groups, fighting not for
self but only for the ideals of the group they represent, are likely
to be more radical and merciless than those that are fought for
personal reasons." (1956;118)
(13)
"Conflict may initiate other types of interaction between
antagonists, even previously unrelated antagonists. It also usually
takes place within a universe of norms prescribing stimulus for
establishing new rules, norms, and institutions...conflict reaffirms
dormant norms and thus intensifies participation in social life."
(1956:128)
(14)
"... conflict also calls for a common organizational structure
to facilitate the acceptance of common rules and conformity with
them" as "the aim of realistic conflict is to attain
specific results, it follows that the contenders have no interest in
pursuing it once such results have been attained. Centralization of
the internal structure of each contending party assures that once
these results are reached, peace can be concluded and maintained
effectively as long as the same conditions prevail." (1956:133)
(15)
"Conflict consists in a test of power between antagonistic
parties. Accommodation between them is possible only if each is
aware of the relative strength of both parties...," but "such
knowledge can most frequently be attained only through conflict."
"Consequently, struggle may be an important way to avoid
conditions of disequilibrium..." (1956:137)
(16)
"Struggle may bring together otherwise unrelated persons and
groups. Coalitions and temporary associations, rather than more
permanent and cohesive groups, will result from conflicts where
primarily pragmatic interests of the participants are involved."
(1956:148-9)
As
in Collins' case, Coser does not state these propositions in the same
format used by Homans and Blau. But the majority of them could be
restated in such a form without loss. It is important to add that
Coser is at least implicitly retaining the assumptions that were
considered to be the "metatheory:" he acknowledges the
primacy of social interaction in human behavior; that human action is
committed on the grounds of interests and is "rational"
(for "realistic" conflict); that the results of interaction
need not be equally beneficial; and that the content of an exchange
can be non-material (e.g., hostility) as well as material.
SUBSTANTIVE
HYPOTHESES
For
a substantive field with profound implications, there have been
relatively few scientific studies of communal religious sects. But
since communal religious sects do share some important properties
with communes, religious sects, and voluntary associations in
general, pertinent material can be gathered from each of these areas.
It is satisfying to note that the hypotheses so accumulated do bear
some relation to the propositions outlined above, whether
intentionally so or not.
By
far the most insightful work regarding the success or failure of
communes is that of Rosabeth Moss Kanter (1972). She suggests that
the central problem determining the longevity of communes is
"commitment" — "the willingness of people to do what
hill help maintain the group because it provides what they need,"
especially their need for self-identity. (Kanter, 1972:66). Thus the
chief exchange being considered is that between the member and the
“commune." Kanter suggests that an individual:
"...
orients himself to a social system instrumentally, affectively, and
morally. That is, he orients himself with respect to the rewards and
costs that are involved in participating in the system, with respect
to his emotional attachment to the people in the system, and with
respect to the moral compellingness of the norms and beliefs of the
system." (1972:68)
Every
individual evaluates and rates the elements of his/her social world
(e.g, his/her commune) in terms of these three dimensions, and "he
chooses to behave toward it in accordance with his rating, the degree
of its positive or negative value for him." (Kanter, 1972:68).
The strength of an individual's commitment is therefore dependent on
the degree to which instrumental, affective, and/or moral incentives
exist within the group. This leads to four elementary hypotheses:
(a)
"Groups in which people have formed instrumental commitments
should manage to hold their members."
(b)
"Groups in which people have formed affective commitments should
report more mutual attraction and interpersonal satisfaction and
should be able to withstand threats to their
existence."
(c)
"Groups in which members have formed moral commitments should
have less deviance, challenge to authority, or ideological
controversy."
(d)
"Groups with all three kinds of commitment,
that is with total commitment, should be more successful in their
maintenance than those without it." (Kanter, 1972:69).
But
these hypotheses do not take into account the fact that an individual
faces alternative social systems, that a given commune competes with
the outside world and perhaps other communes for a given member's
commitment. To obtain the member's commitment, the commune should
ideally utilize two processes, one involving detachment of the member
from alternative social systems and the other affirming the
attachment of the member to the commune (Kanter, 1972:70). This is
true for each kind of commitment—instrumental, affective, or moral.
So, accounting for alternatives, the hypotheses can be refined to
read as follows:
(1)
Groups in which there exists a process of “sacrifice”
(giving up something of value outside the commune) should be more
successful in holding members.
= detaching, instrumental commitment.
(2)
Groups in which there exists a process of “investment”
(putting up something of value to the control of the commune) should
be more successful in holding members.
= attaching, instrumental commitment.
(3)
Groups in which there exists a process of “renunciation”
(giving up competing relationships outside the communal group and
individualistic, exclusive attachments within)
should
be more successful in holding members.
= detaching, affective commitment.
(Kanter,
1972:73)
(4)
Groups in which there exists a process of “communion”
(getting members to identify with the group) should be more
successful in holding, members. =
attaching, affective commitment.
(5)
Groups in which there exists a process of "mortification"
(wherein a member will "lose himself" by subjecting his
action and self-identity to definition by the community) should be
more successful in holding members.
= detaching, moral commitment.
(6)
Groups in which there exists a process of "transcendance"
(wherein a member surrenders himself to the greater power and meaning
of the community, thereby "finding himself") should be more
successful in holding members.
= attaching, moral commitment.
(7)
The greater the number and kinds of processes used by the community,
the greater the chance of success.
(Kanter, 1972:72-4).
It
is noteworthy that her analysis of 91 communal organizations,
comparing "successful" communes lasting one generation (25
years) or more to the "unsuccessful" ones with shorter
lives, tended to support her hypotheses. However, Kanter herself
notes that even her "successful" cases eventually died. To
explain this, she moves to the next higher level of interaction,
namely the interaction between the commune and the external world.
The
commune exists in a state of tension between two organizational
poles, "Gemeinschaft" and "Gesellschaft."
Gemeinschaft organization entails the "nonrational, affective,
emotional, traditional, and expressive components of social action as
in a family," whereas Gesellschaft relations comprise the
rational, contractual, instrumental, and task-oriented actions, as in
a business corporation" (Kanter, 1972:148). The struggle
between these organizational forms results largely from external
exchange, and it poses a series of "dilemmas" for the
community: "permeability, isomorphism, value indeterminism, and
perpetuation strategies"... (Kanter, 1972:150). Permeability
means "the degree to which community boundaries are open and
permit penetration of movement across them" (Kanter, 1972:151).
Obviously, more open boundaries enhance the possibility of trade, but
they also permit the introduction of opposing ideologies,
temptations, etc. Isomorphism, "structual similarity between
the community and its environment," can also enhance trade; but
it, too, may result in elimination of things that distinguish the
community and give it an identity (e.g., mode of dress or speech).
Value indeterminism can be a valuable way to meet change because it
engenders flexibility; it can also engender confusion and conflict.
Perpetuation strategies concern leadership succession and
recruitment. Recruits contribute to the success of the community,
but they are also a potential source of disharmony. Leadership
succession is similarly vital, but it may lack legitimacy if
"charisma" has heretofore been the chief qualification.
From these arguments we may construct a final hypothesis:
(8)
The greater the degree of which the commune can restrict
permeability, value indeterminism, and isomorphism, control
recruitment, and legitimize leadership succession, the greater the
chance of the community's survival.
There
are apparently few other theoretical analyses in regard to the
determinants of survival of communes in general. Three
"ethnographers" or historians of communal organizations --
Nordhoff, Hinds, and Albertson -- do, nevertheless, make some
statements suggestive of hypotheses.
Charles
Nordhoff tells us that for communes to survive:
(9)
the commune must provide greater security and moral satisfaction than
the society from which it derives;
and
(10)
the people must perceive their previous circumstances as unbearable.
(1875:
406-8).
William
Hinds adds that
(11)
"... the growth and prosperity of a Community requires a strong
communistic spirit at its center at all stages of its career, and in
proportion as that is weakened or displaced
by
individualism it tends toward decadence and death." (1908:592)
In
a review of "mutualistic communities" in America, Ralph
Albertson lists a series of "outstanding weaknesses“ that have
existed in communes and have led to their demise. From this list it
is possible to glean the following hypotheses:
(12)
the more dictatorial the politics of the commune, the lower the
chance for successful survival.
(13)
the less is business ability coupled with idealism, the lower the
chance for success. (Albertson,
1936:436).
Albertson's
list of weaknesses also affirms hypotheses (8) and (9). He believes
that the passing of communes has been due to, among other things, the
communes' inability "to compete with American conditions... of
prosperity and unlimited opportunity,” to their inability
to successfully isolate themselves from American society, and to poor
recruit selection (Albertson, 1936:436).
Some
authors in the substantive field of "religious sects" have
put forth relevant hypotheses that deserve testing. Among them would
be Ellsworth Faris, Howard Vollmer, and Troeltsch and Niebuhr (as
presented by Whitworth, 1970, and Clark, 1937). Faris examines the
survival of religious sects from a dynamic, historical perspective.
He asserts that sects arise in times of societal disorganization, and
people join for the “new stable or organizing influence"
(Faris, 1955:85). But, he hypothesizes,
(14)
"The period of extreme isolation, conflict, and high morale is
followed by a more irenic era when conformity with the outside world
gets approval. The end result is the disappearance of the sect as a
separate conflict group..."
(Faris, 1955:85).
He
does not elaborate in this instance as to why approval grows.
Elsewhere he appears to support hypotheses already suggested: the
penetration of external beliefs, values, etc. into the culture of the
religious sect means that "isolation begins to disappear;"
and it is this isolation, born of conflict with the world (political
or ideological) and supported by physical segregation and/or cultural
distinctiveness, which enables a sect to survive (Faris, 1955:82-3)
"Processes
of socialization and control" form the background against which
Howard Vollmer develops his hypotheses regarding the factors
affecting the "competence“ of religious orders. His first
hypotheses is virtually identical to Kanter's hypotheses concerning
"mortification" (5) and "transcendance" (6): "...
the competences of religious orders are significantly affected by the
fact that they require the total commitment of their membership...
through emphasis upon alienation as well as indoctrination of
members," leading to "the stability (constancy) and unity
(consensus) of those organizations" (Vollmer, 1957:22). The
more novel observation is that
(15)
"... religious orders vary in competence according to whether
their membership is primarily committed to the ideology of the order
or to the authority structure. Where authoritative commitment
predominates, ... the organization seems to be more useful in an
instrumental relationship to a larger organization, more adaptable to
changes in external conditions, and more suitable to expansion of
operations."
(Vollmer, 1957:22).
Perhaps
the classic hypothesis concerning religious sects is the one
formulated by Ernst Troeltsch and refined by H. R. Niebuhr. Like
that of Faris, it is a dynamic, evolutionary proposition. The
foundation of this proposition was allegedly set by Troeltsch, who
said
that the impetus behind sect formation lay in the ignorance,
temperament, and desperate needs of the "lower strata"
(Clark, 1937:19; Whitworth, 1975:3). Niebuhr elaborated this
statement into the "denominalization thesis:"
(16)
The demise of a sect qua "sect" is associated with the
second generation, because (a) the increasing prosperity born of
thrift and industriousness and (b) inability to imbue the next
generation with the zeal of the first removes the social and
psychological forces that led to the emergence of the sect.
(Clark 1937:19; Whitworth, 1975:4).
Of
course, Niebuhr was not suggesting that the original organization
would necessarily disappear; rather, he was asserting that its
character would change from that of a "sect" to that of a
"church."
The
final source of relevant hypotheses would be the literature on
commitment to "voluntary associations." Probably the best
known statement in this field was made by Howard Becker, author of
the "Side-Bet" hypothesis. He contended that:
"...commitment has been achieved by making a side bet."
The committed person has acted in such a way as to involve other
interests of his... he has stated something of value to him,
something originally unrelated to his present line of action, on
being consistent in his present behavior. The consequences of
inconsistency will be so expensive that inconsistency…is no longer
feasible." (Becker, 1960:35). This is basically a more
elaborate version of Kanter's "investment" hypothesis, so
it will not be treated separately. We will only note that it affirms
the idea that the greater is member investment, the greater are the
association's chances for survival.
A
large number of studies in the field of voluntary associations have
been done utilizing the concept of "benefits," which has an
obvious link to the propositions concerning "rewards."
Mancur Olson's work is appropriate here. The central problem that he
perceives
is that which is faced by groups supplying "public goods,"
i.e., benefits garnered from "achievement of any common goal or
the satisfaction of any common interest" such that "no one
in the group is excluded from the benefit..." (Olson, 1965:15):
getting
members
to contribute toward the survival of the group. The answer to the
problem appears to vary with the size of the”incentives" --
benefits accruing only to those who join the group and/or contribute
to its maintenance -- because the greater the number of
people
involved, the smaller are the rewards any given individual will
receive and the less will that person perceive his/her contribution
as consequential (Olson, 1965:48,50). From this discussion two
hypotheses can be derived, the first implied and the second stated
by
Olson himself:
(17)
Small groups need not supply "selective incentives" in
order to maintain themselves.
(18)
"Small groups will further their common interests better than
larger groups." (Olson,
1965:49-51,52)
The
more general statement to be found among voluntary association
theorists can be found in the work of Warner and Heffernan (1967).
The wording of their hypotheses clearly reflects the behaviorist
axioms:
(19)
“The greater the number of benefits a member thinks he receives
from the organization, the greater will be his participation in the
organization.
(20)
"The more a member thinks that receiving the benefits is
contingent upon participation, the greater will be his participation
in the organization."
(Warner and Hefferman, 1967:141).
The
distinguishing feature of these hypotheses is that they stress the
organization's role in the exchange. That is, survival of the
association depends not only on how much the individual gives the
organization, but also on how much and how selective are the rewards
the organization bestows on its members.
The
same orientation exists in the now-classic article by Clark and
Wilson (1961) on "incentive systems." One of the important
hypotheses suggested by them is:
(21)
"A net outflow of incentive resources will produce decreases in
organizational size or levels of activity, or both, and will
ultimately produce either an alteration in the incentive
system
or organizational collapses."
(Clark and Wilson, 1961:133).
These
"incentive resources" fall into three categories, according
to Clark and Wilson: "material" incentives, which are
tangible and can be assigned monetary value; "solidary"
incentives, which are intangible and amount to the non-monetary
rewards of associating oneself
with others (e.g., status or camaraderie); and "purposive"
incentives, also intangible, but tied explicitly
to the organizational goals (1961:134-6). Now, "a particular
organization may appeal to many motives," but "nonetheless,
many organizations may be distinguished by the incentives upon which
they principally rely" (Clark and Wilson, 1961:136,137).
Communal religious sects certainly strive to provide material
well-being and a sense of family and identity as well as goals to be
achieved, but it seems fair to say that they emphasize the latter,
"purposive," sort of incentives. Clark and Wilson add that
the type of incentive that is stressed defines the problems and
concerns that will face the organization, (1961:137-8); organizations
using their goals or ideology as a chief
incentive
- the type including communal
religious sects - will therefore have specific kinds of threats to
their survival. They suggest that,
(22)
The more are "purposes" the "basic instrument of
unity," the more will purposes become the source of "the
most heated internal disputes."
(23)
Where there is more emphasis on purposes as the chief incentives,
"failure to realize ideals or disputes over the choice of ideals
aggravates intra-associational conflict..." (Clark
and Wilson, 1961:146,148-9).
It
is assumed that this internal conflict, if severe, may reduce the
survival chances of such an organization.
METHOD
It
is hoped that some sense of the utility of the above hypotheses can
be gained by examining the life of three communal religious sects --
the Jansonists of Bishop Hill, the Separatists of Zoar, and the
Hutterites. These three groups were chosen on two grounds: (a) they
fit the definition of "communal religious sects;" and (b)
they had a special relevance to the hypothesizing of Rosabeth Moss
Kanter, certainly the theorist most closely associated with the study
of communes. Kanter, if you recall, tested her hypotheses by
dividing communes into "successful" communes, such as Zoar, lasting
81 years, and "unsuccessful" communes such as Bishop Hill,
in existence a scant 11 years. Nevertheless, it is obvious that Zoar
eventually broke up, and that raises questions as to why such a
long-lived community should end up going the way of Bishop Hill. The
answers may arise from a comparison of those two communes with the
Hutterites, a communal religious sect that has survived four
centuries. Why Kanter excluded the Hutterites from her analysis is
unknown to this writer, but it provides an opportunity to see how
well her hypotheses fit a communal sect that has existed far longer
than the "successful" communes included in her study.
Of
course, the material on the lives of these three communal sects was
voluminous. To make it usable, it had to be broken down according to
some theoretical framework. Largely on the basis of personal
preferences, it was decided that the data would be broken
down into three main areas -- economy, polity, and ideology. This
reflects the neo-Marxist or Weberian perspective, which asserts that
these are the central features of a social system, and that these
features are at once interrelated but relatively autonomous. It was
felt that further insight could be gained by dichotomizing each facet
of the social system into two categories, "internal" and
"external." Hence, each of the communal sects examined in
this paper will be regarded in terms of six characteristics: internal
economy, relations with the external economy, internal polity,
relations with external polity, internal ideology, and external
ideology. The dichotomy was chiefly introduced to include
consideration the community’s relationship with the social world
that surrounded it. It was reasoned that, so long as a community did
not existin a social "vacuum," the exchange within the
community (and its maintenance) would depend to some degree on the
community's exchange with the outer world. A similar concern is
reflected in Kanter's
work
(1972).
DATA:
BISHOP
HILL
The
founding of the Bishop Hill Commune derived from two forces: the
Swedish "Devotionalists" and Eric Janson. The
"Devotionalists" were an early 19th Century group of
pietists who were dissatisfied with the lack of purity and vitality
in the established (Lutheran) Church of Sweden. Janson, born in
Sweden in 1808, was the markedly eloquent but little educated son of
a small-landed peasant. The conjunction of these two forces came
after a "divine miracle" cured him of rheumatism, for he
became inspired and went about preaching zeal and purity of faith and
challenging the Swedish Church, and this led him to find quite a
following among the Devotionalists. However, as the size of his
following grew, so did the attacks from the Swedish Church and the
populace. When the persecution became severe, it was decided to
emigrate to the United States and found a community there.
Thus
they began life anew in Henry County, Illinois, in 1846. The
immigrants were mostly young (25-35 years old) and mostly working and
lower class -- farmers, craftsmen, factory workers, miners, and the
poor -- and they were largely illiterate. A few, nevertheless, were
wealthy. And wealthy or not, all money was placed in a common fund
to pay for passage, land, etc. in the hope of raising a "new
Jerusalem whence the glorious truths of Jansonism were to extend to
all the world" (Hinds, (1908:343). The undertaking began with
about 400 souls in the winter of that year.
ECONOMY
Internal
By
all accounts, the economy of Bishop Hill began in poverty. Their
first shelters were no more than ravines and trenches covered with
sod, and their food consisted almost wholly of pork and corn.
Diseases - fever, ague, and cholera - ravaged the camp, killing well
over a hundred of their number. As they had spent most of their
means in emigration, this condition of poverty lasted eighteen
months.
Their
perseverance paid off, however, and the next ten years were marked by
continual improvement in their condition. The years from 1846 to 1850 were the years in which the community struggled to develop: they grew flax and produced linen; made adobe and kiln-dried bricks, producing a church and dwelling places; they bought a saw-mill and built a grist-mill. By 1850 there were over a thousand Jansonists and the community had purchased about 360 acres, though they were still in debt. The golden era of the commune began in 1850, when Jonas Olson became leader following Janson's death, and extended approximately to 1857. In this time, the Bishop Hill community was able to: collect debts from property in Sweden, erect more brick dwellings, a carpentry shop, a blacksmith shop, a wagon-making shop, a brewery, a tailor, a school, a town hall, a hotel, own 10,000 acres of land, cattle, horses, negotiate labor contracts with the railroad, and speculate in stocks and bonds. They were out of debt, indeed wealthy, but the wealth did not last. Their degree of economic independence at this point is impressive.
Agriculture was reputedly the chief concern of the community, evidenced in the “busy seasons" by the neglect of other pursuits, and and it was diversified enough to satisfy their table needs. Clothing, shelter, and sundry other comforts were likewise produced by the community itself: clothing from their flax, shoes from their leather, and so on. Nonetheless, they refused to indulge in luxuries: pastries were only made on holidays and clothing was uniform. As to the "relations of production," all property was held in common, but labor was to some extent divided according to age, sex, and skill. Women generally performed the less-skilled jobs. Everyone who was over 14 years of age and able-bodied was expected to work. How equal were the rewards of their work is difficult to reconstruct. The fact that they had a common dining hall and distributed (uniform) clothing in equal shares leads one to suspect that there was little material inequality.
The community suffered a severe, perhaps fatal, economic blow in the Crisis of 1857. One member of the community's board of ‘trustees had succeeded in monopolizing the community resources, and he heavily involved these resources in the external economy, especially in banking, railroads, real estate, and stocks and bonds. The national depression, hitting hard all areas of finance, therefore eliminated much of the community's savings and credits. Within a few years the community disintegrated.
External
There had always existed some form of economic exchange between the Bishop Hill community and the world outside. The men of the commune often labored for their neighbors and contracted some railroad work. A contract was also made for the production of broom-corn. Money was borrowed from outside. Flax seeds and some linen goods were exported. Their shops and mills brought in some revenue (e.g., wagon-making), as did their hotel. The Shakers of Pleasant Hill, Kentucky, introduced the Jansonists to better breeds of cattle and better methods of dyeing wool. But it appears that the most extensive relations with the external economy did not begin until the mid-1850‘s when a member of the board of trustees was able to heavily involve the community in stock speculation, commercial establishments in a town near Bishop Hill, real estate, railroad contracts, and a coal mine. Much of the community's capital was summarily lost in the financial Panic of 1857, with the result that the commune had to mortgage some property and borrow a considerable sum of money.
There had always existed some form of economic exchange between the Bishop Hill community and the world outside. The men of the commune often labored for their neighbors and contracted some railroad work. A contract was also made for the production of broom-corn. Money was borrowed from outside. Flax seeds and some linen goods were exported. Their shops and mills brought in some revenue (e.g., wagon-making), as did their hotel. The Shakers of Pleasant Hill, Kentucky, introduced the Jansonists to better breeds of cattle and better methods of dyeing wool. But it appears that the most extensive relations with the external economy did not begin until the mid-1850‘s when a member of the board of trustees was able to heavily involve the community in stock speculation, commercial establishments in a town near Bishop Hill, real estate, railroad contracts, and a coal mine. Much of the community's capital was summarily lost in the financial Panic of 1857, with the result that the commune had to mortgage some property and borrow a considerable sum of money.
POLITICS
Internal
The leadership of Bishop Hill progressed through two phases. The first phase, from 1846 to 1850, might be described as "authoritarian." In this period, Eric Janson ruled on both spiritual and temporal affairs: he "appointed overseers, foremen, supervisors, distributed jobs, devised undertakings, planned industries, scheduled programs." (Calverton, 1941:120). All exchanges of property or goods came under his purview; in general, he was responsible for organizing their lives and "nothing was undertaken without his sanction" (Calverton, 1941:120).
Internal
The leadership of Bishop Hill progressed through two phases. The first phase, from 1846 to 1850, might be described as "authoritarian." In this period, Eric Janson ruled on both spiritual and temporal affairs: he "appointed overseers, foremen, supervisors, distributed jobs, devised undertakings, planned industries, scheduled programs." (Calverton, 1941:120). All exchanges of property or goods came under his purview; in general, he was responsible for organizing their lives and "nothing was undertaken without his sanction" (Calverton, 1941:120).
This authoritarian period ended with Janson's death in 1850. He was murdered by an ex-soldier, John Root, whom Janson had permitted to join the commune and marry Janson's cousin. Root tired of communal life and tried to take his wife with him away from the commune, against her will. After Root had removed her twice and the commune had returned her both times, he decided to shoot Janson, and did so.
At Janson's funeral, Janson's wife proclaimed her son heir to authority, although, because of his youth, another Jansonist, Andreas Berglund, was assigned by her to be his guardian.
The rule of Berglund and Janson's wife and son was brief, however. Jonas Olson, a Jansonist and former leader of the Devotionalists, returned from a mission on which Janson had sent him, and he contested the inheritibility of divine authority. Olson became more or less the de facto leader of the commune.
At Janson's funeral, Janson's wife proclaimed her son heir to authority, although, because of his youth, another Jansonist, Andreas Berglund, was assigned by her to be his guardian.
The rule of Berglund and Janson's wife and son was brief, however. Jonas Olson, a Jansonist and former leader of the Devotionalists, returned from a mission on which Janson had sent him, and he contested the inheritibility of divine authority. Olson became more or less the de facto leader of the commune.
In 1853, the community drafted a Charter and became legally incorporated. The charter established a seven-member board of trustees, "who were to hold office during good behavior, subject to removal by a majority vote of the male members of the community, and who were given, subject to such by-laws as might be adopted, full power over all its business affairs." (Hinds, 1908:351-2). This might be called the "democratic" phase in the leadership of Bishop Hill, and it was indeed contrary to Janson's pronouncements, as he had desired both spiritual and temporal powers to be hereditary.
The By-laws of 1853 gave the trustees authority to determine who could be members, to determine compensation for those leaving or retiring, to manage all economic affairs, and to hold a business meeting once annually (and whenever a male majority deemed it advisable). Thus in several respects it would appear that control had simply passed from a lone individual (Janson) to a committee. This impression is reinforced by evidence that:
"The demand for the charter did not spring from the people. The majority of the community did not know what the charter meant... They had no voice in the election of the trustees. The board of trustees was already made up when the petition to the Legislature asking for a charter was presented to the members of the community for their signatures" (Mikkelsen, 1892:51)
Nevertheless, "the seven trustees in question were all persons who had been appointed to positions of trust under Eric Janson," and “the distribution of authority remained very much the same as it had been before." (Mikkelsen, 1892:51). Jonas Olson continued to be the most powerful force in the community as a trustee, but he never gained the charismatic authority and devoted allegiance that Janson had enjoyed.
In 1860, following the financial disaster experienced by the commune in 1857, new by-laws were adopted that severely curtailed the powers of the trustees — all economic affairs were to be guided by the disposition or instruction of the community, and meetings were to be held monthly. But the incumbent trustees refused to acknowledge the legality of the new by-laws and the matter ended in the dissolution of Bishop Hill (1861-2) and the parceling out of the property. This dissolution may have been further aggravated by conflict between the young and the elders over the restrictions imposed upon lives of members, as it led to the formation of two factions, one communistic and the other individualistic, and at the time of dividing up the property it was split between them. The communistic faction then broke up (1862), ending any remaining semblance of the Bishop Hill commune.
The By-Laws of 1854 and 1860 are also instructive regarding the rights and obligations of members, and the change of those over time. According to the By-Laws of 1854: (1) admission to membership was contingent on a favorable evaluation by the trustees and the surrender of all personal property to the community; (2) should a member discontinue membership, compensation for services would be at the discretion of the board of trustees (it would not be a "right“); and (3) any conduct or doctrine contrary to those of the community could result in expulsion. In 1860, one very important change was made in regard to member rights -- "any withdrawing or discontinuing member shall be entitled to compensation for the work he or she may have performed for the Colony" (Mikkelsen, 1892:79).
External
The political relations of the Bishop Hill community with the external society appear to have been largely placid. Only three events stand out in their history as evidence of external political interaction: (1) the incorporation of the community in 1853 by the State of Illinois, enabling the Jansonists to buy and sell as a corporation rather than in the name of individuals (e.g., Janson); the dissolution of the community, 1861-2, which involved a lengthy process of adjudication by the courts; and the events surrounding the John Root episode.
The latter case is particularly revealing as to the degree to which the Jansonists were accepted by the surrounding society. John Root twice took his wife away from the commune against her will, and each time the Jansonists succeeded in bringing her back. Root then formed a mob to forcibly remove her from Bishop Hill, but the attack was repelled by the neighbors of the Jansonists, who had armed themselves in their support. The matter was brought to trial, but the affair was ended when, during a recess, Janson was shot to death by Root. Root was summarily imprisoned.
IDEOLOGY
The By-laws of 1853 gave the trustees authority to determine who could be members, to determine compensation for those leaving or retiring, to manage all economic affairs, and to hold a business meeting once annually (and whenever a male majority deemed it advisable). Thus in several respects it would appear that control had simply passed from a lone individual (Janson) to a committee. This impression is reinforced by evidence that:
"The demand for the charter did not spring from the people. The majority of the community did not know what the charter meant... They had no voice in the election of the trustees. The board of trustees was already made up when the petition to the Legislature asking for a charter was presented to the members of the community for their signatures" (Mikkelsen, 1892:51)
Nevertheless, "the seven trustees in question were all persons who had been appointed to positions of trust under Eric Janson," and “the distribution of authority remained very much the same as it had been before." (Mikkelsen, 1892:51). Jonas Olson continued to be the most powerful force in the community as a trustee, but he never gained the charismatic authority and devoted allegiance that Janson had enjoyed.
In 1860, following the financial disaster experienced by the commune in 1857, new by-laws were adopted that severely curtailed the powers of the trustees — all economic affairs were to be guided by the disposition or instruction of the community, and meetings were to be held monthly. But the incumbent trustees refused to acknowledge the legality of the new by-laws and the matter ended in the dissolution of Bishop Hill (1861-2) and the parceling out of the property. This dissolution may have been further aggravated by conflict between the young and the elders over the restrictions imposed upon lives of members, as it led to the formation of two factions, one communistic and the other individualistic, and at the time of dividing up the property it was split between them. The communistic faction then broke up (1862), ending any remaining semblance of the Bishop Hill commune.
The By-Laws of 1854 and 1860 are also instructive regarding the rights and obligations of members, and the change of those over time. According to the By-Laws of 1854: (1) admission to membership was contingent on a favorable evaluation by the trustees and the surrender of all personal property to the community; (2) should a member discontinue membership, compensation for services would be at the discretion of the board of trustees (it would not be a "right“); and (3) any conduct or doctrine contrary to those of the community could result in expulsion. In 1860, one very important change was made in regard to member rights -- "any withdrawing or discontinuing member shall be entitled to compensation for the work he or she may have performed for the Colony" (Mikkelsen, 1892:79).
External
The political relations of the Bishop Hill community with the external society appear to have been largely placid. Only three events stand out in their history as evidence of external political interaction: (1) the incorporation of the community in 1853 by the State of Illinois, enabling the Jansonists to buy and sell as a corporation rather than in the name of individuals (e.g., Janson); the dissolution of the community, 1861-2, which involved a lengthy process of adjudication by the courts; and the events surrounding the John Root episode.
The latter case is particularly revealing as to the degree to which the Jansonists were accepted by the surrounding society. John Root twice took his wife away from the commune against her will, and each time the Jansonists succeeded in bringing her back. Root then formed a mob to forcibly remove her from Bishop Hill, but the attack was repelled by the neighbors of the Jansonists, who had armed themselves in their support. The matter was brought to trial, but the affair was ended when, during a recess, Janson was shot to death by Root. Root was summarily imprisoned.
IDEOLOGY
Internal
The belief system of the Jansonists, and the associated practices, might also be described in terms of "phases." The first phase of Jansonist ideology lasted roughly from the founding of the commune (1846) to the death of their leader (1850), and it was the period in which Eric Janson was the fount of all religious doctrine. Janson thought that the established churches of Christianity were spiritually dead, and that he, together with his disciples, would bring about a spiritual rebirth to Christianity and a message that eventually all nations would hearken to. Evidently Janson saw himself as intimately associated with the Second Advent of Christ; he believed that Christ was revealing His will through him, and he (Janson) was to bring about the "millennium“ in which his heirs would rule the earth.
The foundations for this new world were to be laid in the construction of a "New Jerusalem" in America. According to Janson, this "New Jerusalem" should recreate the life-style of the "Primitive Christian Church," i.e., "inculcating humble and prayerful lives, equality of conditions, and community of property" (Nordhoff, 1875:343). It has been suggested that this religious communism, though justified by Scripture, was inspired by the simple fact that many of his followers were poor and illiterate.
The actions and practices of the Bishop Hill community reveal the impact of these teachings. They worked according to ability and distributed the goods and services equally. Though most forms of property were regarded as being held in common, families were permitted private clothing and shelter. Much of their time was devoted to worship: they met for "devotions" three times a day and had two Sunday services. Their adherence to the humble and simple predictably led them to forswear all amusements and embellishments: fine foods and clothes were forbidden, the men did not cut their hair, the women had no ornaments, no books or newspapers were permitted (except some old school books and those texts relevant to Jansonism), and no flowers decorated the grounds. A school was established one year after the founding of the commune for the teaching of English, usually taught by a native American. Twelve of its graduates were appointed by Janson to travel about and spread the word of Jansonism. And the strength of the Jansonists' belief in the divine mission of their leader is attested to by the fact that for three days following his murder, they lay waiting for his resurrection.
The period from the death of Janson (1850) to the dissolution of the community (1862) saw the decline of the Jansonist doctrines. The de facto successor to Janson, Jonas Olson, "modified some of the excesses of the Jansonist theology in a Devotionalistic direction, abolishing the Jansonist catechism altogether and thoroughly revising the hymn-book in 1857" (Mikkelsen, 1892:58). He was also involved in the move to incorporate celibacy into the ideology. It seems that one of the more successful of Janson's twelve apostles sent out to convert the world returned to Bishop Hill impressed by Shakerism, and he succeeded in convincing Jonas Olson of the correctness of the practice of celibacy. Olson then imposed the practice of celibacy upon the community, at least upon those not already married — but at the cost of many resignations and expulsons. It is reported that by 1859 "religious dissensions ran so high that all community of worship was apparently destroyed" (Mikkelsen, 1892:69).
External
None of the historians of Bishop Hill reported in any detailed way upon the ideology of the social world surrounding the commune, but it can be said with certainty that it was in many ways ideologically antithetical to Jansonism. Especially apparent are the relatively greater emphases on secularism, individualism, competition, democracy, "creature" comforts (e.g., amusements), concern for freedoms, achievement, and perhaps the tacit acceptance of such inequalities as existed.
ZOAR
The history of the Zoar commune begins in Wurttemburg, Germany. In the early 1800's, there lived in this region a number of Pietistic sects antagonistic to the established Lutheran Church. The founders of Zoar came from one such sect, referred to as "Separatism." They denounced the state church for "lack of faith" and "hypocrisy," and refused to send their children to the church-controlled schools. Furthermore, they refused to grant any special honor to state officials and refused to serve in the military. As a result, they were fiercely persecuted by both church and state. Many of the Separatists decided to emigrate to America, among them a group that had collected around a mystic named Barbara Grubermann. Unfortunately, Grubermann died before the voyage was undertaken, so one of her disciples, a peasant named Joseph Baumler (later “Bimeler") was elected leader. Three hundred arrived in America in August, 1817, and began the construction of the village of Zoar, Ohio, that winter. As most were from the poorer classes, the venture was accomplished only through the sharing of funds and considerable aid from the Quakers. It may be that Baumler truly gained legitimacy as leader during this arduous journey, for the Separatists found him to be adept as a physician, social worker, and preacher as well.
ECONOMY
Internal
The first year at Zoar (1818) was one of economic hardship. The winter snows and spring floods inhibited labor, and there was much to accomplish. The work — clearing the land, planting, raising houses — took long hours, and "only the necessaries of life were consumed" (Landis, 1898:174). Because there were many poor, elderly, and ill among them, it was decided that all property should be owned in common. And in order that their population should not outstrip their production, a policy of celibacy and abstinence was maintained for several years.
Through emphasis on thrift and industry, the Zoarites became largely self-sufficient: they spent much of their efforts in agricultural pursuits, including livestock and flax (for linen); they fabricated every article of clothing, and made a profit by selling wool and linen outside the village: they owned mills and factories for the production of flour, feed, cider, beer, oil, and lumber, some of which was also exchanged with outsiders; they had numerous shops — carpenter's, blacksmiths, tanner's, joiner's, barber's, tailor's, dressmaker's, and barber's; they made their own pottery, baked goods, tools, and dwellings, the latter actually made to accommodate several families so that fewer needed to be built; they had a church (and preacher), a school (and teacher), a hotel with a tavern, and a physician (Bimeler). And they were not averse to working for their neighbors. Much of their prosperity began in 1827, when they were able to supply labor and material for a canal being constructed in the area, for it eliminated all their debts.
According to reports, labor was not highly differentiated. Women primarily did household chores and light agricultural work (e.g., milking), though they assisted in the summer harvests as well; the men worked at the various trades or farmed. The three trustees did not even divide management into separate spheres of concern until the latter half of the commune’s existence.
The fruits of their labor were, as agreed, shared by all. The Society allotted food, housekeeping supplies, and clothing to each individual or family. Food and supplies are said to have been "ample," and allowance was made for the entertainment of guests. Two suits of clothes - at first uniform, later more styled, but always unadorned— were given to each individual annually. Coal and wood came from a common supply. Housing, as mentioned above, was frequently shared by several families, but each family looked to its own affairs.
The lifestyle was regarded as "comfortable" by one author (Randall, 1899:35) and if wealth is any evidence, it was estimated in 1845 that their property was worth $1,000,000. By 1874, they owned over seven thousand acres of land and their population numbered about 300 individuals, mostly middle-aged.
This happy state of affairs did not continue indefinitely. Between 1874 and 1898 (the year of dissolution) the Society's operations became less and less profitable: the outer world was further advanced in both production and methods of distribution, so the Zoarite goods could be underpriced. The balance of trade reversed. Debts became greater than income; and where they had once been chiefly producers they became chiefly consumers, as many of the goods could be gotten more cheaply outside the commune. Second, "free enterprise" began to filter into economic life. Individuals would perform services for neighbors or visitors to Zoar and receive some remuneration, and naturally inequalities developed. Third, the Zoarites began to employ a number of outsiders and rented land to a few more, probably because so many of their young men began to leave the commune, and perhaps because so long as they were wealthy someone else could be hired to do the more odious tasks.
The Separatist Society of Zoar disbanded in 1898 after three years of intense debate. The 146 full members of the Society were granted equal shares in the property.
External
The relations of Zoar with the external economy can be roughly divided by means of the periods of growth and decline.
The period of growth extended from about 1819 to 1874. During this time, Zoar was largely self-sufficient. Work on the Ohio Canal in 1827 had cleared them of debts and thus permitted expansion. The Society's factories exported cloth and yarn; the mills did commerce in flour and lumber; the many craft shops transacted a good deal of business with the neighboring farmers; and of course, agricultural produce was shipped to the larger cities of Cleveland, Philadelphia, and New York. Their hotel accommodated many summer visitors and the tavern inside had a steady trade with both the visitors and the hired hands. The practice of hiring outsiders began in 1834, when cholera killed a third of their members. Their general store supplied their neighbors as well as themselves. And often the Zoarites would hire themselves out as laborers to outsiders.
The period of decline came some time after 1874. The most marked feature of this period was the cessation of the export of several goods, and indeed the increasing importation of goods, due to the comparative cheapness of production outside the Society (e.g., they began to purchase some fabrics for clothing). A few shares of land were rented to outsiders. And as mentioned earlier, the time was also characterized by the encroachment of individual enterprise and the continued reliance on hired labor. The author William Hinds, visiting Zoar around 1876, was told there were 171 hirelings -- perhaps over half the number of Zoarites (given the 1874 figures).
POLITICS
Internal
The basic political arrangements of Zoar are found in the successive constitutions of the Society. The Consitiution of 1819, signed by 53 males and 104 females, established the principles of common ownership of property, management by annually elected directors,
resolution of community disputes by arbitration, and the relinquishing of any claims to property by resigning members. The Constitution of 1824 affirmed all the above, but added: (a) provisions for the election of three trustees, a court of appeals, and a cashier, though terms of office were left to the discretion of the community; (b) children of members would be under the care and direction of the directors until they reached the age of majority; (c) new members had to be approved by the directors and two-thirds of the current members, and they had to agree to submit to all the articles in the Constitution. The final and most detailed Constitution was drawn up in 1832, when the Separatist Society of Zoar was legally incorporated by the State of Ohio. This Constitution said:
(1) all officers were to be elected;
(2) all full members could vote, male and female;
(3) elections were to be decided by ballot and majority vote;
(4) there would be three trustees, each serving a three year term that could be renewed indefinitely; they were to manage the daily affairs of the society, such as production and distribution; they were to report monthly to the Standing Committee of Five;
(5) there would be a Standing Committee of Five to act as the "High Court of Appeals" during arbitration and as consultant to the trustees and the agent;
(6) there would be an agent responsible for trade with the outside;
(7) there would be a cashier to handle all community finances, reporting to the trustees annually;
(8) membership would be divided into two classes, the First Class of “novitiates" and the Second Class of "full associates."
(a) an individual could become a member of the First Class following a year of working for the Society and agreement by the individual; an individual could become a member of the Second Class after another year and agreement by both parties;
(b) Members of the First Class agreed to labor for the Society, place their children under the care of the Society, and settle all disputes by arbitration within the Society, whereupon the Society would attend to all the novitiate's physical needs, but would supply no more than was usual; they gave up no property, but neither could they vote or hold office;
(c) Members of the Second Class agreed to all the obligations made of the First Class, but were additionally required to sign over all property to the Society; in return, the Society
would provide the necessities of life and the member could vote and hold office;
(9) Any officer who had lost the confidence of the community could be removed from office by majority vote.
Legal and religious prescriptions were few in number. There were, however, prohibitions against dancing and the use of tobacco, and aristocratic pretensions were suppressed by strictures against "distinctions of rank or fortune" (Hinds, 1908:127). The latter rule was excepted in the case of their leader, Joseph Bimeler, who did enjoy an estate more expensive than that of any other member.
To bring the wayward into line, the Society could only take one of two measures: an appeal to the member is conscience or expulsion. At one time they could also punish an individual by prohibiting that person from attending meetings.
The leadership of the Separatist Society deserves special attention. The most powerful figure in the life of Zoar was Joseph Bimeler. He served the Zoarites as a physician, as the agent for their business affairs, as an advisor, and as an arbitrator in their disputes, but he was most influential in his roles of religious visionary and preacher. It was he who was foremost in formulating the practices and doctrines of the Zoarites. The weight of his word is seen clearly in the accounts of how the community decided to adopt the practice of marriage, for example. It is curious, if incidental, that he was like the leader of Bishop Hill, Eric Jansen, in two ways: he was physically deformed - - one eye bulged out and he was lame in one leg - - and he was regarded as an eloquent speaker. After Bimeler died in 1853, it was found that no one could wholly replace him. Though the office of religious leader had more of an informal than Constitutional validity, the position was next filled by Jacob Sylvan, better known for his writing than his oratory. Upon Sylvan's death in 1862, Christian Weebel was elected to the post, as he had been the chief religious orator since Bimeler's death. The community came to be dissatisfied with him, and in 1871, they elected Jacob Ackerman out of respect for his distinguished and lengthy service to Zoar. He served until the dissolution of the Separatist Society in 1898, at which time, of course, the rest of the political framework became void as well.
External
Zoar seems to have always maintained harmonious political relations with the outside world. In 1832, the Separatist Society of Zoar was legally incorporated by the State of Ohio. During the Civil War, Zoar complied with federal military regulations by paying their taxes and buying substitutes for military service; a few of their number enlisted. Court cases arose infrequently over the rights of expelled members to shares of property that the Society denied them, but the cases were always settled in favor of the Society.
The belief system of the Jansonists, and the associated practices, might also be described in terms of "phases." The first phase of Jansonist ideology lasted roughly from the founding of the commune (1846) to the death of their leader (1850), and it was the period in which Eric Janson was the fount of all religious doctrine. Janson thought that the established churches of Christianity were spiritually dead, and that he, together with his disciples, would bring about a spiritual rebirth to Christianity and a message that eventually all nations would hearken to. Evidently Janson saw himself as intimately associated with the Second Advent of Christ; he believed that Christ was revealing His will through him, and he (Janson) was to bring about the "millennium“ in which his heirs would rule the earth.
The foundations for this new world were to be laid in the construction of a "New Jerusalem" in America. According to Janson, this "New Jerusalem" should recreate the life-style of the "Primitive Christian Church," i.e., "inculcating humble and prayerful lives, equality of conditions, and community of property" (Nordhoff, 1875:343). It has been suggested that this religious communism, though justified by Scripture, was inspired by the simple fact that many of his followers were poor and illiterate.
The actions and practices of the Bishop Hill community reveal the impact of these teachings. They worked according to ability and distributed the goods and services equally. Though most forms of property were regarded as being held in common, families were permitted private clothing and shelter. Much of their time was devoted to worship: they met for "devotions" three times a day and had two Sunday services. Their adherence to the humble and simple predictably led them to forswear all amusements and embellishments: fine foods and clothes were forbidden, the men did not cut their hair, the women had no ornaments, no books or newspapers were permitted (except some old school books and those texts relevant to Jansonism), and no flowers decorated the grounds. A school was established one year after the founding of the commune for the teaching of English, usually taught by a native American. Twelve of its graduates were appointed by Janson to travel about and spread the word of Jansonism. And the strength of the Jansonists' belief in the divine mission of their leader is attested to by the fact that for three days following his murder, they lay waiting for his resurrection.
The period from the death of Janson (1850) to the dissolution of the community (1862) saw the decline of the Jansonist doctrines. The de facto successor to Janson, Jonas Olson, "modified some of the excesses of the Jansonist theology in a Devotionalistic direction, abolishing the Jansonist catechism altogether and thoroughly revising the hymn-book in 1857" (Mikkelsen, 1892:58). He was also involved in the move to incorporate celibacy into the ideology. It seems that one of the more successful of Janson's twelve apostles sent out to convert the world returned to Bishop Hill impressed by Shakerism, and he succeeded in convincing Jonas Olson of the correctness of the practice of celibacy. Olson then imposed the practice of celibacy upon the community, at least upon those not already married — but at the cost of many resignations and expulsons. It is reported that by 1859 "religious dissensions ran so high that all community of worship was apparently destroyed" (Mikkelsen, 1892:69).
External
None of the historians of Bishop Hill reported in any detailed way upon the ideology of the social world surrounding the commune, but it can be said with certainty that it was in many ways ideologically antithetical to Jansonism. Especially apparent are the relatively greater emphases on secularism, individualism, competition, democracy, "creature" comforts (e.g., amusements), concern for freedoms, achievement, and perhaps the tacit acceptance of such inequalities as existed.
ZOAR
The history of the Zoar commune begins in Wurttemburg, Germany. In the early 1800's, there lived in this region a number of Pietistic sects antagonistic to the established Lutheran Church. The founders of Zoar came from one such sect, referred to as "Separatism." They denounced the state church for "lack of faith" and "hypocrisy," and refused to send their children to the church-controlled schools. Furthermore, they refused to grant any special honor to state officials and refused to serve in the military. As a result, they were fiercely persecuted by both church and state. Many of the Separatists decided to emigrate to America, among them a group that had collected around a mystic named Barbara Grubermann. Unfortunately, Grubermann died before the voyage was undertaken, so one of her disciples, a peasant named Joseph Baumler (later “Bimeler") was elected leader. Three hundred arrived in America in August, 1817, and began the construction of the village of Zoar, Ohio, that winter. As most were from the poorer classes, the venture was accomplished only through the sharing of funds and considerable aid from the Quakers. It may be that Baumler truly gained legitimacy as leader during this arduous journey, for the Separatists found him to be adept as a physician, social worker, and preacher as well.
ECONOMY
Internal
The first year at Zoar (1818) was one of economic hardship. The winter snows and spring floods inhibited labor, and there was much to accomplish. The work — clearing the land, planting, raising houses — took long hours, and "only the necessaries of life were consumed" (Landis, 1898:174). Because there were many poor, elderly, and ill among them, it was decided that all property should be owned in common. And in order that their population should not outstrip their production, a policy of celibacy and abstinence was maintained for several years.
Through emphasis on thrift and industry, the Zoarites became largely self-sufficient: they spent much of their efforts in agricultural pursuits, including livestock and flax (for linen); they fabricated every article of clothing, and made a profit by selling wool and linen outside the village: they owned mills and factories for the production of flour, feed, cider, beer, oil, and lumber, some of which was also exchanged with outsiders; they had numerous shops — carpenter's, blacksmiths, tanner's, joiner's, barber's, tailor's, dressmaker's, and barber's; they made their own pottery, baked goods, tools, and dwellings, the latter actually made to accommodate several families so that fewer needed to be built; they had a church (and preacher), a school (and teacher), a hotel with a tavern, and a physician (Bimeler). And they were not averse to working for their neighbors. Much of their prosperity began in 1827, when they were able to supply labor and material for a canal being constructed in the area, for it eliminated all their debts.
According to reports, labor was not highly differentiated. Women primarily did household chores and light agricultural work (e.g., milking), though they assisted in the summer harvests as well; the men worked at the various trades or farmed. The three trustees did not even divide management into separate spheres of concern until the latter half of the commune’s existence.
The fruits of their labor were, as agreed, shared by all. The Society allotted food, housekeeping supplies, and clothing to each individual or family. Food and supplies are said to have been "ample," and allowance was made for the entertainment of guests. Two suits of clothes - at first uniform, later more styled, but always unadorned— were given to each individual annually. Coal and wood came from a common supply. Housing, as mentioned above, was frequently shared by several families, but each family looked to its own affairs.
The lifestyle was regarded as "comfortable" by one author (Randall, 1899:35) and if wealth is any evidence, it was estimated in 1845 that their property was worth $1,000,000. By 1874, they owned over seven thousand acres of land and their population numbered about 300 individuals, mostly middle-aged.
This happy state of affairs did not continue indefinitely. Between 1874 and 1898 (the year of dissolution) the Society's operations became less and less profitable: the outer world was further advanced in both production and methods of distribution, so the Zoarite goods could be underpriced. The balance of trade reversed. Debts became greater than income; and where they had once been chiefly producers they became chiefly consumers, as many of the goods could be gotten more cheaply outside the commune. Second, "free enterprise" began to filter into economic life. Individuals would perform services for neighbors or visitors to Zoar and receive some remuneration, and naturally inequalities developed. Third, the Zoarites began to employ a number of outsiders and rented land to a few more, probably because so many of their young men began to leave the commune, and perhaps because so long as they were wealthy someone else could be hired to do the more odious tasks.
The Separatist Society of Zoar disbanded in 1898 after three years of intense debate. The 146 full members of the Society were granted equal shares in the property.
External
The relations of Zoar with the external economy can be roughly divided by means of the periods of growth and decline.
The period of growth extended from about 1819 to 1874. During this time, Zoar was largely self-sufficient. Work on the Ohio Canal in 1827 had cleared them of debts and thus permitted expansion. The Society's factories exported cloth and yarn; the mills did commerce in flour and lumber; the many craft shops transacted a good deal of business with the neighboring farmers; and of course, agricultural produce was shipped to the larger cities of Cleveland, Philadelphia, and New York. Their hotel accommodated many summer visitors and the tavern inside had a steady trade with both the visitors and the hired hands. The practice of hiring outsiders began in 1834, when cholera killed a third of their members. Their general store supplied their neighbors as well as themselves. And often the Zoarites would hire themselves out as laborers to outsiders.
The period of decline came some time after 1874. The most marked feature of this period was the cessation of the export of several goods, and indeed the increasing importation of goods, due to the comparative cheapness of production outside the Society (e.g., they began to purchase some fabrics for clothing). A few shares of land were rented to outsiders. And as mentioned earlier, the time was also characterized by the encroachment of individual enterprise and the continued reliance on hired labor. The author William Hinds, visiting Zoar around 1876, was told there were 171 hirelings -- perhaps over half the number of Zoarites (given the 1874 figures).
POLITICS
Internal
The basic political arrangements of Zoar are found in the successive constitutions of the Society. The Consitiution of 1819, signed by 53 males and 104 females, established the principles of common ownership of property, management by annually elected directors,
resolution of community disputes by arbitration, and the relinquishing of any claims to property by resigning members. The Constitution of 1824 affirmed all the above, but added: (a) provisions for the election of three trustees, a court of appeals, and a cashier, though terms of office were left to the discretion of the community; (b) children of members would be under the care and direction of the directors until they reached the age of majority; (c) new members had to be approved by the directors and two-thirds of the current members, and they had to agree to submit to all the articles in the Constitution. The final and most detailed Constitution was drawn up in 1832, when the Separatist Society of Zoar was legally incorporated by the State of Ohio. This Constitution said:
(1) all officers were to be elected;
(2) all full members could vote, male and female;
(3) elections were to be decided by ballot and majority vote;
(4) there would be three trustees, each serving a three year term that could be renewed indefinitely; they were to manage the daily affairs of the society, such as production and distribution; they were to report monthly to the Standing Committee of Five;
(5) there would be a Standing Committee of Five to act as the "High Court of Appeals" during arbitration and as consultant to the trustees and the agent;
(6) there would be an agent responsible for trade with the outside;
(7) there would be a cashier to handle all community finances, reporting to the trustees annually;
(8) membership would be divided into two classes, the First Class of “novitiates" and the Second Class of "full associates."
(a) an individual could become a member of the First Class following a year of working for the Society and agreement by the individual; an individual could become a member of the Second Class after another year and agreement by both parties;
(b) Members of the First Class agreed to labor for the Society, place their children under the care of the Society, and settle all disputes by arbitration within the Society, whereupon the Society would attend to all the novitiate's physical needs, but would supply no more than was usual; they gave up no property, but neither could they vote or hold office;
(c) Members of the Second Class agreed to all the obligations made of the First Class, but were additionally required to sign over all property to the Society; in return, the Society
would provide the necessities of life and the member could vote and hold office;
(9) Any officer who had lost the confidence of the community could be removed from office by majority vote.
Legal and religious prescriptions were few in number. There were, however, prohibitions against dancing and the use of tobacco, and aristocratic pretensions were suppressed by strictures against "distinctions of rank or fortune" (Hinds, 1908:127). The latter rule was excepted in the case of their leader, Joseph Bimeler, who did enjoy an estate more expensive than that of any other member.
To bring the wayward into line, the Society could only take one of two measures: an appeal to the member is conscience or expulsion. At one time they could also punish an individual by prohibiting that person from attending meetings.
The leadership of the Separatist Society deserves special attention. The most powerful figure in the life of Zoar was Joseph Bimeler. He served the Zoarites as a physician, as the agent for their business affairs, as an advisor, and as an arbitrator in their disputes, but he was most influential in his roles of religious visionary and preacher. It was he who was foremost in formulating the practices and doctrines of the Zoarites. The weight of his word is seen clearly in the accounts of how the community decided to adopt the practice of marriage, for example. It is curious, if incidental, that he was like the leader of Bishop Hill, Eric Jansen, in two ways: he was physically deformed - - one eye bulged out and he was lame in one leg - - and he was regarded as an eloquent speaker. After Bimeler died in 1853, it was found that no one could wholly replace him. Though the office of religious leader had more of an informal than Constitutional validity, the position was next filled by Jacob Sylvan, better known for his writing than his oratory. Upon Sylvan's death in 1862, Christian Weebel was elected to the post, as he had been the chief religious orator since Bimeler's death. The community came to be dissatisfied with him, and in 1871, they elected Jacob Ackerman out of respect for his distinguished and lengthy service to Zoar. He served until the dissolution of the Separatist Society in 1898, at which time, of course, the rest of the political framework became void as well.
External
Zoar seems to have always maintained harmonious political relations with the outside world. In 1832, the Separatist Society of Zoar was legally incorporated by the State of Ohio. During the Civil War, Zoar complied with federal military regulations by paying their taxes and buying substitutes for military service; a few of their number enlisted. Court cases arose infrequently over the rights of expelled members to shares of property that the Society denied them, but the cases were always settled in favor of the Society.
Beyond the above instances, the only other mention of external political relations concerns the legal disbandment of the Society, at which point three people from outside the community were asked to appraise the Zoarite property and divide it into shares of equal value.
IDEOLOGY
Internal
From the founding of Zoar in 1817 until the death of their leader, Bimeler, in 1853, the Zoarites were firm believers and followers of the Separatist theology. Their creed included the usual Christian principles -- belief in the Trinity of God, the Holy Scriptures, the Fall of Man, and salvation through Christ -- but the Zoarites distinguished themselves by their doctrines espousing the following: the banishment of all ceremonies; the rendering of honor to God alone; rejection of the roles of priest and minister; the circumscription of sexual relations by necessity to procreate; refusal to serve in the military or to have their children attend the (German) clerical schools; but, nonetheless, their recognition of the external authorities.
Bimeler was undeniably the pivotal force in the community. He allegedly served the Zoarites in such diverse roles as business manager, physician, and preacher. In line with their ideology, he had no official or legal sanction to be the preacher, but he was universally accepted. The power of his testimony among the Zoarites is most clearly shown in the reports that, following his death, no speaker could be found that was his match, and few religious texts other than the collections of Bimeler’s discourses were felt to be satisfying. The topics of his discourses ranged widely, including such matters as theology, etiquette, health, and housekeeping. He stressed such ideological positions as the necessity for separation of the Good Christians (the Zoarites) from the False Christians and the world generally, the ethical bankruptcy of the clergy, the futility of evangelism overseas, and the superiority of celibacy to matrimony. He taught such attitudes as "self-sacrifice, a desire for heavenly things, temperance, or moderation in all things, preference of others to themselves, contentment..." (Nordhoff, 1875:113). And his words were believed to be divinely inspired.
The practices of the Zoarites generally reflected these principles, especially before Bimeler's death. For example, they practiced "moderation" in the comforts they allowed themselves: each family maintained gardens, and the community maintained a purportedly beautiful public garden full of flowers, trees, and other plants; the architecture of their dwellings was evidently stylish, and Bimeler's home sported an ”aristocratic" flavor with "piazzas, balcony, and cupola" (Hinds, 1908:102-3); the community had a brass band; but these pleasures were tempered by the prohibition of dancing, the rarity of literature, concerts, lectures, and festivals, and the simplicity and uniformity of their clothing, at least until the waning years. Indeed, it is said they did not encourage visitors until many years after Bimeler's death.
Perhaps in keeping with their attitudes toward evangelizing, it has been noted that the Zoarites never sought converts among outsiders. That fact may have had an impact on the practices evolved from their beliefs concerning celibacy and marriage. For the first ten years of its existence, there was a de facto prohibition on marriage ardently supported by Bimeler, but between 1828 and 1830 matrimony regained acceptance. One reason was that Bimeler himself decided to marry and, reversing his former discourses, preached in favor of the practice. Another reason allegedly was to assure Zoar of future members, inasmuch as they were not seeking converts. It should be noted, though, that spouses had to be chosen from among the Society's members, or else one faced expulsion.
Child-rearing practices also changed during Bimeler's lifetime. From 1819 to 1845, it was agreed that children should be placed under the care of the community from the age of three. But the practice was discontinued because of its purported inconvenience. A community school existed from the earliest days, teaching the basic elementary studies in German. But there was no library.
Religious observances consisted of three services on Sunday, highlighted with sermons by Bimeler.
The "separation of the Good Christians from the False" was held pretty stringently in the years of the birth and growth of the community. Visitors were not encouraged. Little literature from the outside world was available. There was little interest in the political affairs of the world, excepting perhaps national politics.
The most notable fact, however, is the absence of any explicit mention of communism in their creed. By all accounts, this is because the undertaking was not begun with common ownership in mind. Rather, communism was instituted because so many of the followers were impoverished, aged, sick, or crippled that several feared the community would die if communism was not observed. The ideological argument that bolstered this was that, as "there was no distinction between them in religion, so there should be none in rank or fortune" (Landis, 1898:174). And, of course, there was the model of the Early Christian Church to appeal to. It is worth mentioning, in this regard, that while the Zoarites held many things in common -- land, commerce, church, school, etc. -- several things were regarded as within the domain of each individual family unit, including cooking, laundry, and shelter.
The years following the death of Bimeler in 1853 marked the period of ideological "decline" in adherence to the former beliefs and practices of the Separatist Society of Zoar. The decline appeared in many forms. Whereas their mode of dress had been simple and distinctive, it became stylish and after the fashion of their neighbors. The religious services became little more than recitations of Bimeler's discourses, and as attendance was not compulsory, fewer and fewer people attended them. The school was found by one author to be using books with individualistic phrases and references to "me" and "mine." The former condemnation of tobacco came to be ignored. The pacifistic elements of their creed were forgotten by a few who joined the Union Army during the Civil War.
The separation of Zoar from the world became more and more a myth. The hotel encouraged tourism, and the village became a popular summer resort. The practice of hiring outsiders continued. The tavern served both visitors and employees of the community as well as the Zoarites. Subtle forms of "free enterprise" entered into the economic life, as some Zoarites would perform services for their visitors and neighbors (e.g., laundry) and keep for themselves the remuneration. Teaching in their school was now done in English as well as German (in 1874), and the pupils now included the children of the surrounding farms as well as those of Zoar.
Perhaps the most severe blow was that many of the young people no longer shared their elders' ideals and attitudes. They became enamored with individualism and the way of life in the outside world. Consequently, many left Zoar, and those that stayed chafed under the religious restrictions. It is alleged that in the waning days of the Society the young people had become "for the most part infidel and materialistic"; that they showed "a lack of spirituality, the growth of pride and selfishness, and, among some of the young fellows, rowdyism and intemperance" (Landis, 1898:190). Acceptance of the ideal of individualism spread from the youth to the older members, and eventually it was decided fitting to disband (1898).
External
As in the case of Bishop Hill, none of the authors concerned with Zoar mentioned the elements of American ideology prevailing at the time. But there seems little danger in surmising that the ideology contained the elements mentioned earlier: secularism, individualism, democracy, materialism, tacit acceptance of inequality, competition,
concern for freedoms, and achievement.
THE HUTTERITES
The modern Hutterites can trace their ideological and biological heritage back to Southern Germany in the early 1500's. This was a time of social upheaval: the Catholic Church and the Protestants struggled for souls, and "harassing economic conditions" led to a peasant revolt (Deets, 1975:3).
In the midst of this the forerunner of the Hutterites, the Anabaptist movement, was born. At a theological conference in Zurich in 1525, the founding principles of the Anabaptists (and Hutterites) were expostulated: rejection of infant baptism, the union of church and state, military service, and oath-taking, and the affirmation of individual religious liberty as "the supremacy of the human conscience." It is said that Anabaptism appealed to members of all classes, but most heavily, it would appear, among the poorer. Many were peasants and artisans.
The response of the Church and State to the Anabaptist "heresy" was persecution, even to invoking the death penalty against them. An estimated 1,000 Anabaptists were executed.
Around 1528, an exodus began to Moravia (now the Czech Republic) because of the degree of religious liberty allowed there. One group of refugees initiated the practice of communism, by pooling all of their possessions together. Once in Moravia, however, factionalism erupted over the issues of pacifism, communism, and leadership.
The movement might have faltered if not for the arrival of Jacob Hutter in 1529. Though reputedly no charismatic figure, Hutter was able to reunite these communistic Anabaptists , give them a sense of purpose, and establish their institutions.
Persecution erupted once more and thousands were killed, including Hutter in 1536.
A period of disorganization followed, ending with the assumption of leadership by Peter Riedeman in 1542. He was able to restore unity, set down the ordinances of their way of life, and publish numerous treatises on the Hutterite faith. The number of Hutterites grew to about 25,000 by 1600.
But external problems arose . War came in 1593 between Austria and Turkey, and the Hutterites were mistreated by both sides. This was followed by the Thirty year's War (1618) and the plague (1621).
Their numbers decimated, the Hutterites fled first to Transylvania, but another war and more persecution drove them, under considerable duress, to migrate to Wallachia. That proved no haven either, so when the Russian government promised them the freedom to live as they chose, they immigrated to Ukraine (1770).
After a century of peace, the Russian government reversed its policy and demanded that the Hutterites serve in the Russian military. The Hutterites therefore decided to emigrate to the United States, settling in South Dakota between 1874 and 1879. Over 1,200 arrived, half of them dedicated to communal living and the other half not. Those who sought to live communally were split into three main colonies, based on their leaders and their time of arrival: the Schmiedeleut, the Dariusleut, and the Lehrerleut. These distinctions are still made by Hutterites.
Although they began to prosper, the persecution had not ended. When the United States entered World War I, Hutterite youths were conscripted. Hutterite resistance brought harassment, imprisonment, and some property damage. Soon thereafter all the Hutterites, excepting a single colony, moved to Canada. As United States policies became more tolerant (in the 1930's and 40's) of communal farms and conscientious objection to military service, many Hutterites returned.
And the persecution began again. Since the 1940's, the Hutterites have been the subject of legislation in both the United States, and Canada, legislation intended to regulate or restrict the manifest Hutterite expansion. It is said that the Hutterites have come to accept persecution, physical or legal, and foresee no change in the future.
ECONOMY
Internal
The Hutterite economy is dominated by agriculture, though it is not the sole pursuit. They raise a wide variety of crops and livestock, not in the hope of reaping the greatest gain -- often such a strategy is not the most efficient -- but with the aim of maintaining work for all throughout the year. The kinds of crops and livestock, the degree of mechanization, and the scale of production are all questions to be determined by community (colony) consensus. Many practical crafts are also undertaken, such as "bookbinding, clock repairing, tinsmithing, furniture making, shoemaking,tailoring"..., "and the production of cloth and toys (Hostetler, 1974:182).
At present the individual colonies are extremely self-sufficient: "The Brethren raise most of their own food; make their own clothes, including shoes; build their own buildings; and make most of their own furniture." Further, they "supply practically all of their own labor" (Kephart, 1976:258). They do, however, buy sugar, flour, and farm machinery.
Labor is divided technically by occupation, but occupations are stringently divided according to age and sex. Women are traditionally responsible for such household activities as cooking, sewing, and child-rearing, but occasionally they assist in the fields. Men assume all the management positions, agricultural duties, and craft work. Farming takes precedence in the warm months, craft occupations during the cold.
Additionally, it is reported that a kind of competition exists in the colonies in regard to production and expertise, but competition between departments rather than individuals.
The distribution of goods and services is governed by three basic principles: equality (communism), need, and austerity. "Equality" means that each individual receives according to specified, impartial and universal criteria, notably age and sex, but not position. "Need“ refers to "socially sanctioned needs, not individual wants" (Hostetler, 1974:194). "Austerity” means that the goods and services to be distributed should not cater to self-indulgence or worldly entertainments like dancing and movies. Rather, simplicity and thrift form the guidelines. These principles seem not to be taken as absolutes, for instances can be found where the rules have been bent a little. For example, many of the colonies now allot a monthly allowance to individuals, to be spent as the individual chooses. The specific allotment of community goods varies with the Leut, but room and board is standard: all members live in dormitories that have apartments for each family; they are all served by two common dining halls, (one for adults, one for children), a laundry, and a bakery.
Their rapid population growth necessitates "branching," or forming new colonies, about every fourteen or fifteen years. It usually occurs as the number of members in the colonies approach 150 people, for then "there will not be enough managerial jobs to go around... cliques and factions begin to form," and "per capita return from the agricultural enterprise may diminish…” (Kephart, 1976:273). As the cost of branching is considerable -- purchasing land, supplies, and equipment -- and as the rate of branching is fairly rapid, the colonies never really have a chance to become inordinately wealthy.
The mechanics of branching are undertaken with great care. Half of the economic burden of forming the new colony is borne by the parent colony, thus diminishing some of the pressures faced in development. Secondly, the members of the new colony are chosen in such a way " that the age and sex distributions of the population are maintained" (Hostetler, 1974:186).
As a measure, perhaps, of their success, the Hutterite operations "are considered superior to those of their neighbors" by "both Hutterites and non-Hutterites..." (Kephart, 1976:259).
External
An economic exchange between the Hutterites and their neighbors has always existed, and may be increasing. During the early years of their settlement in America, they say that their colonies supplied them with all their needs but two -- salt and needles. Today they purchase sugar, flour, and machinery as well.
The character of the current exchange can be further clarified by citing other instances. It has been noted, for example, that there is a constant flow of "salesmen, government officials, teachers, and doctors to the colonies," and that metropolitan areas are only a matter of hours away (Eaton, 1952:333). The latter fact is especially important, because it has been established that there is a definite and direct relation between distance from a city and the viability of a Hutterite colony: those closest to a city suffer the most disruption.
Necessity sometimes forces them to deal with the outside. They have to hire lawyers and accountants for legal defense and tax consulting, and they must hire real estate agents for the purchase of new land. But of their own volition they also engage in the sales of various crops and livestock, and, to a lesser degree, in the sales of certain crafts. If they are in dire need of income, they work for wages outside the colony. If they desperately need labor they hire outsiders. Both of these latter two cases are rare, however.
In spite of this admittedly extensive exchange, it appears that the Hutterites continue to supply themselves with many goods of their own make, and it is believed that "most colonies could survive on their own" if forced to do so (Kephart, 1976:258).
POLITICS
Internal
The Hutterite polity is founded on traditions instead of constitutions.
The chief political entity in the Hutterite system is the "colony" or "Bruderhof," comprising "all persons of Hutterite parentage or persuasion residing on the premises." (Hostetler, 1974:164).
The ultimate source of power in each colony resides in the Church ("Gemein"), which is "all the baptized men and women." (Hostetler, 1974:164) Male members of the Church are able to vote and participate in all major decisions, including the election of leaders.
The chief administrative body in Hutterite colonies abides in a council of four to seven baptized males, including the head preacher, the assistant preacher (or German teacher, or both), the business manager, the farm boss, and perhaps up to three other male members of the Church. The council is charged with responsibility for the major decisions regarding economic operations and social control.
A subordinate council consisting of the head preacher, the business manager, and the farm boss may form to make routine decisions on procedures in the economic enterprise. Obviously, the head preacher is the most important figure, as he is both the spiritual and temporal leader of the community. It is said that the Hutterites are careful not to elect a "dominant" individual to this position, probably because it entails so much critical decision-making concerning the daily life of the community (Kephart, 1976:250). Second to the head preacher in power is the business manager, the individual responsible for the colony's economic affairs. The farm boss is next in importance.
All the council members can hold their office for life, barring a recall by the electorate. The elderly tend to dominate the position of authority, a result of either the infrequency of recall or the Hutterite respect for age (or both).
The methods of decision-making deserve special attention. All of the members of the council are elected by simple majority except the head preacher. Though the exact procedures differ with the colony, the usual method for the head preacher’s election involves (a) a majority vote by the baptized males, (b) the vote of the head preachers from other colonies of the same Leut, and (c) picking the final choice from a hat holding the names of the top candidates. The latter action is intended to allow divine intervention. Even so, investiture follows a few months of probation.
Other issues are decided in a largely democratic manner as well. The usual progression
of events begins with discussion of an issue, perhaps following a policy suggestion by the council, and then the establishment of a [general] consensus. A vote is taken after [general] consensus is achieved. Should anyone continue to disagree, it is expected that he will nevertheless abide by the group decision.
Full membership in the colonies occurs with baptism. The request for baptism is taken as an indication of willingness to submit to the colony and its regulations: no member may own property privately, and should he or she decide to leave the colony, there would be no compensation. The ritual is quite a lengthy process. The candidates -- girls of 19 and young men 20-26 -- are familiar to all members of the colony. The merit of each candidate is weighed in terms of humility, obedience, selflessness, etc.; if the candidate does not measure up, he/she may be asked to postpone application. Those that pass must then recite special prayers and such, listen to sermons directed to them, and then participate in a baptismal ceremony that includes an examination of their beliefs. After baptism, one is permitted to assume adult roles and responsibilities, e.g., marriage.
The membership status of men is slightly different from that of women. Women are regarded as subservient to men. They cannot vote, participate in political discussions, hold office, engage in commerce with the outside, or drive vehicles. All of these are male rights. Nevertheless, the women do exercise some informal influence on colony policies by complaining to or pleading with their husbands. Additionally, husbands are expected to be responsive to their wives and helpful in regard to household chores.
The chief means by which disobedience to authority is controlled in Hutterite colonies consist of both preventive education and punishment. Beginning in infancy, standards of right and wrong are impressed upon a Hutterite with the aim of training them in self-discipline and (it is said) in emotional reaction. The results are a highly developed conscience. The second form of control, punishment, can be ultimately analyzed as varying degrees of rejection.
Threat of rejection gains its force from the emphasis on association and intensity of relationships within the group. When meted out as punishment, the degree of rejection is meant to correspond with the adjudged seriousness of the crime: the most minor violations may result in warnings from neighbors or relatives; slightly more serious infractions may bring a visit from the head preacher; major violations can lead to isolation from contact with fellow Hutterites; and the heinous crimes (e.g., murder) could be met with excommunication and banishment, but this punishment is rarely imposed (because there is rarely need to). Of the two forms of control, Hutterites definitely prefer the development of conscience, for punishment is both antithetical to their beliefs and less effective.
The political system extends between colonies as well as within them. In a significant way, this has been the result of continuous "branching" (the splitting of new colonies from old ones grown too large), for it results in extensive familiar bonds across colonies.
As a rule, colonies regard themselves as united spiritually but independent in temporal affairs. Nevertheless, there is a high degree of interaction even in temporal concerns. The choice of the head preacher for a colony is something that all colonies of the same Leut participate in. In two of the three Leut, "branching" only occurs after all the colonies consent. And, should any colony experience financial difficulties, the other colonies in the Leut are expected to help. A colony that is obviously failing can even be recalled to the parent colony.
As the above statements indicate, the Hutterites continue to acknowledge three main groupings of their sect, based on the three original colonies in North America: the Dariusleut, the Schmiedeleut, and the Lehrerleut. Each Leut has its own bishop and its own annual conference of ministers and business managers. Political interaction between the Leut, however, is rare.
External
History shows that the Hutterites have never been able to avoid political relations with the greater community of which they were a part. The present admits of no break with the past. It appears that Hutterite colonies have generally "made workable accommodations with their neighbors although there are still some flareups" (Kephart, 1976:276). Acts of violence and destruction still occur, but, what conflicts there are, are not as intense as in the past, particularly as the Hutterites have become more active in community affairs.
There are two points of institutional conflict between the colonies and the states or provinces that probably will not abate for some time: schooling and land acquisition.
The states and provinces have required the Hutterites to set up English-speaking schools and have set certification standards that force the colonies to hire teachers from outside. The Hutterites have sought to restrain the influence of the "English " school by selecting the teacher and lecturing him or her on the Hutterite way. They openly and successfully rebelled against the introduction of national symbols.
The second conflict occurs because of their high rate of land acquisition. Several states and provinces have begun to restrict Hutterite expansion by laws.
In other respects, contemporary political relations between the Hutterites and the communities around them are a bit more tranquil. In accord with their principles, the Hutterites continue in their refusal to cast a vote or hold a public office in the societies outside. Their long-standing refusal to serve in the military has been accommodated in the present laws regarding conscientious objection. In all other regards, the Hutterites are perceived as obedient to civil authorities as, for example, in the payment of taxes.
IDEOLOGY
Internal
Much of the Hutterite ideology consists of tenets held by many Christian denominations: there is an omnipotent and omniscient God who created all things and endowed them with order; this divine order establishes the nature of good and evil, for evil is a transgression of the order; human nature led to the Fall of Man away from the divine order, and only through Christ and proper living can Man restore his relationship to God. It is in the delineation of the "proper life" that distinguishes the Hutterites from most. The outstanding features of the Hutterite vision of the proper life include: (1) non-resistance; (2) economic communism; (3) separation from the world; (4) selflessness; (5) austerity; (6) self-sufficiency; (7) adult baptism; (8) rejection of oaths; and (9) respect for authority and the natural and supernatural order of the universe.
The observation of these beliefs is easily demonstrated. The principle of austerity is reflected in their simple, unadorned mode of dress, the prohibition of all forms of entertainment but two -- visiting other Hutterites and reading "daily newspapers, farm journals, religious works, and German Mennonite literature" (Kephart, 1976:255) -- and perhaps in their restriction of affirmative or negative replies to "yes"or"no". The ideal of communism is seen in their distribution of all things according to need and the absence of private ownership. Selflessness is a very important ideal to them, and they consequently attempt to eliminate any situational or perceptual source of pride, vanity, and individuality. For example, the Hutterites try to remove distinctions of social status and emphasize "self-denial, humility, and submissiveness" in their education (Hostetler, 1974:145).
Of course, when these principles are translated into codes of behavior, the codes are much more detailed. To illustrate, the ideal of isolation has yielded codes against voting and office-holding in the external society. Respect for the perceived natural order has led to prohibition of birth control and divorce (except for adultery).
The Hutterite belief system is supplemented by a number of values and attitudes. They appear to value health, as they are concerned about their diets and sometimes consult nutritionists. They value hard labor because it is regarded as an expression of love for their fellow colonists. Conservatism appears to be valued in itself, for the women are clothed in 16th Century dress and they do not purchase cameras. And perhaps the most important attitude they harbor is the one variously called "nondisruptive change" (Kephart, 1976:253) and "controlled acculturation" (Eaton, 1952:334). It amounts to the gradual and limited acceptance of items from its external culture in such a way that they do not wholly sacrifice their ideals.
Nevertheless, the principles are bent somewhat. In the face of demands for some private gain, a small monthly allowance has been conceded in all the Leut, though it would seem to conflict with the principle of communism. The principle of austerity has likewise less severe over the years. Under pressures for comfort and adornment, the Hutterite code was adapted to permit the purchase of shoes from outside, fur linings on winter clothes, and mattresses instead of feather beds. The ideal of self-sufficiency has been abrogated somewhat with the purchase of factory-made devices where they are related to production. The Hutterites are well known for keeping up to date with agricultural technology.
The fate of the ideology is contingent on at least two of the Hutterite institutions: the Church and the educational system. Religious observances pervade their lives: ritualistic prayers are said every morning, at every meal and at every religious service; services are held every evening, every Sunday, every holiday, and at weddings, funerals and baptisms; the singing of hymns occurs daily, whether at the services or at home; and there is an annual communion service the day after Easter that symbolizes their unity. It is said that "A Hutterite may stay away from a religious meeting with impunity," but it is also noted that "few do" (Deets, 1975:24).
The Church's influence in the community's affairs extends far beyond the observances. The chief documents of the Hutterian Church -- the Bible and the "Chronicles“ (their historical records) -- are the foundation of all their daily practices. Perhaps it is for this reason that conformity in daily life is reportedly more highly regarded than worship.
As the Hutterites do no evangelizing and have few converts, great importance is attached to the education and socialization of their children into the Hutterian Way. As soon as an infant is able to eat solid food the training is begun: before and after each meal its hands are clasped together by the mother, who repeats a prayer. When the child demonstrates comprehension, discipline is added, including corporal punishment. From ages three to six, the child attends kindergarten, where he or she is taught obedience, cooperation, and passivity in addition to many prayers and hymns. Thereafter, the youngsters attend elementary school until age fifteen, and Sunday school until they are baptized into the Church.
The elementary school is split into two programs, referred to as the "German school" and "English school." The English schools were developed largely at the insistence of the states and provinces in which the Hutterites reside. The content of the teaching includes the usual requirements of reading and writing in English, Math, and science, but consciously or unconsciously, the worldly life outside the colony is also communicated.
The Hutterites have reacted in two ways : (1) to advise and censure the English teacher, and (2) establishing a "German school." The German school meets before and after each session of the English school, and its lessons concentrate on the study of German, the Bible, and Hutterite beliefs, practices, and history. Corporal punishment is still used to discipline.
The Sunday school expands on the lessons of the German school. Study consists, naturally, of Hutterite religion and tradition.
All of the above may lead the reader to believe that the Hutterites are homogeneous in belief, practice, condition, and character. A certain homogeneity does indeed exist -- after all, they all share the same background -- but it is not absolute. The young people are constantly being tempted by the wonders and ways of the world outside the colony, and a few leave.
Factionalism, conflict, and disgruntlement have also appeared in some colonies. Sources of discontent include poor leadership, economic problems, power struggles between families, affluence, and unequal job opportunities. If the conflict becomes severe, the parties face two alternatives: "branching" or defection. The number of those choosing to defect is extremely small, an estimated 2% of the Hutterite population.
External
The ideologies of the communities surrounding the Hutterite colonies continue to harbor the same elements mentioned in the treatments of Zoar and Bishop Hill, and hence they are antithetical to Hutterite doctrine as well.
Specific attitudes of outsiders toward the Hutterites range from hostility to sympathy. Some communities fear Hutterite expansionism, and Hutterites are frequently "condemned for their communism, their quaint customs, their refusal to fight for their country, their apartness and clannishness, and their reluctance to participate in the civic affairs of the community" (Kephart, 1976:275). At times these attitudes are coupled with acts of violence and destruction. But it is reported that such attitudes and acts are becoming less typical, especially for those colonies that have begun to contribute more to the affairs of their non-Hutterite neighbors.
ANALYSIS OF THE HYPOTHESES
Obviously, the data on the three communes are not of exactly equal depth and character. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the facts, such as they are, will provide some sort of insight into the potential validity (or lack thereof) of the several hypotheses concerning the success or failure of communal sects that were listed earlier. Those hypotheses will be analyzed according to their order of presentation.
Several of Kanter's hypotheses appear to be supported by the data, although the evidence for some variables is sketchy. One of the less supported hypotheses is the first (1), suggesting a positive association between the community's longevity and processes of sacrifice. All of these communal sects required sacrifices. All of them, for instance, laid down restrictions on certain practices (e.g., dancing) and promoted an austere existence. As a matter of degree, however, it may be true that the Hutterites are far more abstemious than the colonists of Zoar and Bishop Hill ever were, especially when compared to the final days of the two latter communes.
The hypothesized relationship between investment processes and community success (2) appears to be moderately supported. All of the communal sects required full members to surrender all their possessions to the colony, but they differed in the extent to which
compensation could be obtained upon leaving. Bishop Hill first left the matter of compensation to defectors to the discretion of the trustees; in the final years, however, a charter was drawn up that guaranteed reimbursement to full members who chose to leave. At Zoar, the charter denied compensation but, as at Bishop Hill, left the decision to the trustees; hence in some cases compensation was granted, while in others it was not. The Hutterites declare that defectors will not receive compensation, but what they do in fact was never mentioned. I suspect that they stand by their declaration, thus upholding Kanter's hypothesis.
Processes of "renunciation" are also hypothesized to be related to communal survival by Kanter (3). The evidence appears to affirm the claim, but not in all the respects proposed. In regard to renunciation of or separation from the world, it is clear that this ideal has been more stringently observed by the successful communal sect, the Hutterites, than by the defunct communal sects of Zoar and Bishop Hill. However, none of the groups in this study have gone so far as to renounce the formation of couples and families, which are other renunciation processes mentioned by Kanter.
Community survival is also suggested to be dependent on processes leading to "communion" (4), including such things as homogeneity, the sharing of property, and communal labor. This hypothesis is not supported by the data: both the successful and the unsuccessful communal sects were homogeneous by ethnicity and religion, required property to be held in common, and engaged in community-centered labor. There may have been differences in degree, eventually, as the last years of the two unsuccessful communes (Zoar and Bishop Hill) were times of increasing individualism in religious beliefs, property ownership, and work aspirations. But it may be argued that these were symptomatic of other factors, such as changes in leadership, ideology, and their degree of economic interaction with the outside world.
Kanter's fifth hypothesis proposes that the success of a commune is related to the presence of processes of "mortification" (5), such as "confession and mutual criticism," "sanctions," "spiritual differentiation," and "de-individuating mechanisms" (Kanter, 1972:106—11). Unfortunately, the evidence from the three communal sects in this study are not complete enough to offer a wholly adequate test of these relationships. The little data that there is suggests that all the communes, successful and unsuccessful, had "de-individuating mechanisms" like a uniform mode of dress; and both Zoar and the Hutterite colonies have had sanctions other than expulsion. Thus, there is a hint that the hypothesis is not wholly valid.
Support for the hypothesis that processes of "transcendance" aid community survival (6) is mixed, depending on the specific mechanisms: ideology, charismatic leadership, mystery, canons regarding daily activity, conversion requirements, or tradition. The record seems to uphold the hypothesis for the mechanism of tradition, for the two colonies that failed came to the United States without centuries of such experience. Though the data is incomplete, the mechanism of canons regarding daily activity appears influential, for the Hutterites seem to have more such canons than the two unsuccessful communes did. Evidence on the mechanisms of ideology and conversion requirements would seem not to support the hypothesis, as all of the communes, successful and unsuccessful, had such. In the cases of charismatic leadership and mystery, the evidence not only is unsupportive of the hypothesis, but actually seems to affirm the opposite: mystery and charismatic authority were more apparent in the unsuccessful communities of Zoar and Bishop Hill than in the Hutterite colonies.
Reviewing the above results, it would seem that there is a weak association between the number and kinds of commitment mechanisms and community survival (7). In the majority of cases, the successful and unsuccessful communities were equal in these regards, but the Hutterites, the successful communal sect, did have a few more such mechanisms than Zoar and Bishop Hill.
Kanter's final hypothesis is probably the most important. Most of the items said to illustrate the tensions between "Gemeinschaft" and "Gesellschaft" organization -- and equally reflective of the tensions between the community and the external society -- were found to be associated with the survival of the communal sect in the predicted manner (8). The two communes that failed, Zoar and Bishop Hill, were less effective than the Hutterite colonies have been in
External
The ideologies of the communities surrounding the Hutterite colonies continue to harbor the same elements mentioned in the treatments of Zoar and Bishop Hill, and hence they are antithetical to Hutterite doctrine as well.
Specific attitudes of outsiders toward the Hutterites range from hostility to sympathy. Some communities fear Hutterite expansionism, and Hutterites are frequently "condemned for their communism, their quaint customs, their refusal to fight for their country, their apartness and clannishness, and their reluctance to participate in the civic affairs of the community" (Kephart, 1976:275). At times these attitudes are coupled with acts of violence and destruction. But it is reported that such attitudes and acts are becoming less typical, especially for those colonies that have begun to contribute more to the affairs of their non-Hutterite neighbors.
ANALYSIS OF THE HYPOTHESES
Obviously, the data on the three communes are not of exactly equal depth and character. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the facts, such as they are, will provide some sort of insight into the potential validity (or lack thereof) of the several hypotheses concerning the success or failure of communal sects that were listed earlier. Those hypotheses will be analyzed according to their order of presentation.
Several of Kanter's hypotheses appear to be supported by the data, although the evidence for some variables is sketchy. One of the less supported hypotheses is the first (1), suggesting a positive association between the community's longevity and processes of sacrifice. All of these communal sects required sacrifices. All of them, for instance, laid down restrictions on certain practices (e.g., dancing) and promoted an austere existence. As a matter of degree, however, it may be true that the Hutterites are far more abstemious than the colonists of Zoar and Bishop Hill ever were, especially when compared to the final days of the two latter communes.
The hypothesized relationship between investment processes and community success (2) appears to be moderately supported. All of the communal sects required full members to surrender all their possessions to the colony, but they differed in the extent to which
compensation could be obtained upon leaving. Bishop Hill first left the matter of compensation to defectors to the discretion of the trustees; in the final years, however, a charter was drawn up that guaranteed reimbursement to full members who chose to leave. At Zoar, the charter denied compensation but, as at Bishop Hill, left the decision to the trustees; hence in some cases compensation was granted, while in others it was not. The Hutterites declare that defectors will not receive compensation, but what they do in fact was never mentioned. I suspect that they stand by their declaration, thus upholding Kanter's hypothesis.
Processes of "renunciation" are also hypothesized to be related to communal survival by Kanter (3). The evidence appears to affirm the claim, but not in all the respects proposed. In regard to renunciation of or separation from the world, it is clear that this ideal has been more stringently observed by the successful communal sect, the Hutterites, than by the defunct communal sects of Zoar and Bishop Hill. However, none of the groups in this study have gone so far as to renounce the formation of couples and families, which are other renunciation processes mentioned by Kanter.
Community survival is also suggested to be dependent on processes leading to "communion" (4), including such things as homogeneity, the sharing of property, and communal labor. This hypothesis is not supported by the data: both the successful and the unsuccessful communal sects were homogeneous by ethnicity and religion, required property to be held in common, and engaged in community-centered labor. There may have been differences in degree, eventually, as the last years of the two unsuccessful communes (Zoar and Bishop Hill) were times of increasing individualism in religious beliefs, property ownership, and work aspirations. But it may be argued that these were symptomatic of other factors, such as changes in leadership, ideology, and their degree of economic interaction with the outside world.
Kanter's fifth hypothesis proposes that the success of a commune is related to the presence of processes of "mortification" (5), such as "confession and mutual criticism," "sanctions," "spiritual differentiation," and "de-individuating mechanisms" (Kanter, 1972:106—11). Unfortunately, the evidence from the three communal sects in this study are not complete enough to offer a wholly adequate test of these relationships. The little data that there is suggests that all the communes, successful and unsuccessful, had "de-individuating mechanisms" like a uniform mode of dress; and both Zoar and the Hutterite colonies have had sanctions other than expulsion. Thus, there is a hint that the hypothesis is not wholly valid.
Support for the hypothesis that processes of "transcendance" aid community survival (6) is mixed, depending on the specific mechanisms: ideology, charismatic leadership, mystery, canons regarding daily activity, conversion requirements, or tradition. The record seems to uphold the hypothesis for the mechanism of tradition, for the two colonies that failed came to the United States without centuries of such experience. Though the data is incomplete, the mechanism of canons regarding daily activity appears influential, for the Hutterites seem to have more such canons than the two unsuccessful communes did. Evidence on the mechanisms of ideology and conversion requirements would seem not to support the hypothesis, as all of the communes, successful and unsuccessful, had such. In the cases of charismatic leadership and mystery, the evidence not only is unsupportive of the hypothesis, but actually seems to affirm the opposite: mystery and charismatic authority were more apparent in the unsuccessful communities of Zoar and Bishop Hill than in the Hutterite colonies.
Reviewing the above results, it would seem that there is a weak association between the number and kinds of commitment mechanisms and community survival (7). In the majority of cases, the successful and unsuccessful communities were equal in these regards, but the Hutterites, the successful communal sect, did have a few more such mechanisms than Zoar and Bishop Hill.
Kanter's final hypothesis is probably the most important. Most of the items said to illustrate the tensions between "Gemeinschaft" and "Gesellschaft" organization -- and equally reflective of the tensions between the community and the external society -- were found to be associated with the survival of the communal sect in the predicted manner (8). The two communes that failed, Zoar and Bishop Hill, were less effective than the Hutterite colonies have been in
(a) restricting the flow of people across their boundaries,
(b) restricting the amount of doctrinal flexibility, ambiguity, and change, and
(b) restricting the amount of doctrinal flexibility, ambiguity, and change, and
(c) legitimizing the succession of leaders.
One item mentioned in the hypothesis, control over member recruitment, does not appear to be related to survival. All of the communes examined in this paper, whether surviving or defunct, had or have a means of control over recruitment. There is too little information to tell whether there is indeed a relationship between survival and the remaining item in the hypothesis, restrictions on the comparability of the social organization of the commune and the external world. Again, as a matter of degree, it would appear that the Hutterites have made fewer social and cultural compromises with the external society than did Zoar and Bishop Hill after the deaths of their leaders. So the hypothesis is validated to some degree.
Nordhoff's first hypothesis (9) suggests that the successful communal sect offers more security and moral satisfaction than the external society. While both security and moral satisfaction are subjective evaluations, the evidence appears to support it. Both Zoar and Bishop Hill were financially insecure when they disbanded, and both experienced a decline in the degree of adherence to the religion -- presumably a sign of moral dissatisfaction. The Hutterites, on the contrary, are generally economically secure, and adherence to the faith is said to be high.
His second hypothesis (10) is more suspect. All of the sects considered here experienced unbearable circumstances before their founding, but only one continues to survive.
William Hinds proposes (11) that the longevity of a commune is related to the proportion of individualistic ideals and practices existing in it. The association can occur because the values the definitions of rewarding objective phenomena are different, given communist or individualist ideology. In many instances they are even antithetical. This hypothesis seems fairly well supported. The outstanding feature in the waning years of Zoar and Bishop Hill was increasing individualism, while the Hutterites still do not face a revolt by individualists.
The two hypotheses rendered by Ralph Albertson appear to be valid. Referring to the first hypothesis (12), the evidence shows that the two more dictatorial communities, Zoar and Bishop Hill, had much shorter lives than the Hutterite communities, which strive to eliminate strong personalities. This may be because there are special, purposive rewards gained from association with a charismatic dictator, and once he is gone, those rewards can rarely be supplied by anyone else. The other hypothesis (13) declares that longevity depends on business ability. This certainly seems true. Both Zoar and Bishop Hill suffered an economic collapse prior to their dissolution: Zoar had not kept up with external technology and had an unfavorable balance of trade; Bishop Hill lost much of its finances through the effects of the Depression of 1857. The Hutterites, however, have kept abreast of technology and are economically secure. The continuance of material rewards seems to be important, too.
At present, the Faris hypothesis (14) suggesting the inevitability of assimilation is not wholly supported. While it is true that both Zoar and Bishop Hill were born out of conflict and died from conformity, the same has not yet proven true for the Hutterites, though it may. Identifying the sources of increasing assimilation is probably the more important problem. He suggests the disappearance of isolation as one source of assimilation, a matter already examined.
The more novel of Vollmer's hypotheses (15) does not appear to be upheld: the two communes where the membership was loyal more to the authority structure than the ideology were not the successful ones. Indeed, the converse seems true: The Hutterites enjoy success while emphasizing ideology over leadership.
Niebuhr's "denominalization thesis" (16), like Faris's hypothesis, is also denied by present evidence. Though the deaths of Zoar and Bishop Hill are associated with the second and third generations, the Hutterites have lived many generations past that. He may be correct in pointing out poor socialization as one "cause of death": in both Zoar and Bishop Hill the waning years were marked by increasing expressions of individualism. But he may yet be incorrect in suggesting that prosperity is a "cause" for the demise of communes, for Zoar and Bishop Hill met their ends amid financial calamity, while the Hutterites continue to enjoy a "comfortable" life (though the latter's wealth is depleted by continuous "branching").
Olson's two hypotheses have to be treated separately and with slightly different referents. The first hypothesis (17) suggests that the failure of the relatively small communal colonies we have examined need not be associated with a deficiency of "selective incentives." The facts seem to contradict this assertion. At Zoar people who were not full members could still obtain every privilege besides voting and holding office; moreover, they did not have to surrender all property to the community, as the full member did. Economic and ideological "selective" incentives were lacking as well: in the final stages the Zoarites found that the outer world could offer as much or more in the way of material and spiritual satisfaction. A similar realization came to the Jansonists of Bishop Hill after the death of their charismatic leader and the financial crisis of 1857. The Hutterite colonies, on the other hand, continue to offer their members the incentives of economic security and ideological distinction, as well as opportunities for political influence. Selective incentives seem to be just as vital to small groups as large.
To test Olson's second hypothesis (18), the comparison will be made between the Hutterite colonies, which grow no larger than 150 people, and the colonies of Zoar (300 members) and Bishop Hill (over 1,000 members). The hypothesis suggests that smaller groups are more likely to succeed, and the above figures would appear to bear this out.
Hypothesis (19) states a general view of theorists in the area of voluntary associations, i.e., the more gains a member receives, the more he/she will work for the group. Unfortunately, the data reflects organizational processes more closely than individual acts or perceptions. On the basis of what the organization was able to offer individuals, the hypothesis seems valid. For, as was mentioned above, the colonies that disbanded had fallen into times of declining economic viability and ideological distinctiveness.
A similarly individual-level hypothesis is expressed in (20): a member will work more for the group if he believes that getting benefits from the group depends on it. As we only have access to organizational-level data, we can only infer that the degree to which the organization makes benefits contingent on participation should be related to its success or failure. Once more we are plagued by incomplete information. All of the communal sects required the surrender of property to the community by all full members, so the successful colonies cannot be distinguished on these grounds. But, at least in Zoar, a novitiate received almost exactly the same rewards as a full member. This is not so in the Hutterite colonies, so this may affirm the supposition. Further affirmation may lie in the policies of compensation for defectors: Zoar and (eventually) Bishop Hill had liberal policies of compensation for those who left; at best guess, the Hutterites do not (but the data are lacking). In sum, there are reasons to believe that the unsuccessful colonies made less distinction between full members and others in regard to economic, political, and ideological benefits, and thus, reward was less contingent on full participation. But because of the methodological problems, this conclusion is a tenuous one.
Paraphrasing Clark and Wilson's hypothesis (21), failure of a communal sect can be related to a loss of (incentive) resources, specifically the loss of material, solidary, and purposive benefits. This claim is upheld fairly well by the evidence. The unsuccessful communes, Zoar and Bishop Hill, dissolved not long after they began to lose their economic viability and were therefore less able to supply material incentives. Too much of their financial resources were flowing to the external economy. Whether or not solidary or associative incentives were also increasingly, provided by the external society is harder to determine; in the case of Bishop Hill it is only a guess. It is probable, nonetheless, that the amount of solidary incentives existing within the colony was declining in the final years: both Zoar and Bishop Hill experienced dissension and declining observance of the faith, and that no doubt weakened social ties. The decline of the purposive incentives is also attested to by increasing dissension land declining observance of the faith. But for these groups, some of the purposive incentives may have been lost with the death of their leader as well. Needless to say, the majority of the Hutterite colonies have succeeded in maintaining material (economic), solidary (associative), and purposive (ideological) incentives, though occasionally facing difficulties in one or all of these spheres.
Evaluating the validity of hypotheses (22) and (23) requires first a judgment as to the degree to which group purposes are the chief motivators. In my opinion, communal sects do emphasize their purposes as grounds for motivation far more than the material or associative rewards that might be gained. Given this judgment, the former hypothesis predicts that the greatest disputation will be over group purposes. The cases seem to bear this out. Both Zoar and Bishop Hill experienced severe dissension shortly before dissolution: In Zoar, the conflict involved the ideals of communism and individualism; in Bishop Hill, the dissension erupted over the ideal of celibacy. There may be a connection between the degree of conflict over purposes and the viability of the colony. The latter hypothesis (23) adds only that the degree of conflict may be dependent on the degree of realization of ideals or disagreement over the choice of ideals. While none of the colonies suffered disruption because of failure to realize their goals, Zoar and Bishop Hill did experience divisive conflict in regard to the choice of ideals, citing again the disputations surrounding individualism at Zoar and celibacy at Bishop Hill. While Hutterites also have debates over policy, the issues are generally resolved through protracted discussion until a consensus is reached, or in some instances through "branching."
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
A close examination and comparison of the data for the three communal sects permits us to raise many hypotheses beyond the twenty-three treated above. The results of the comparison are shown in the Appendix. Abstracting from the differences between the successful and unsuccessful communal sects, we may tentatively derive the following hypotheses:
(a) economy: the less economically viable the colony becomes (perhaps following a period of prosperity), the less the chance of its success.
(b) dependency: the greater the dependency on the external economy, the less success.
(c) isolationism: the less isolationist is the colony, the less the chance of its success.
(d) communism: the less is communism part of the ideology, the the less success.
(e) charismatic leadership: the more is leadership based on charisma, the less the chance of success.
(f) leader succession: the less is the colony able to replace its leaders, the less the chance of success.
(g) democracy: the greater the authoritarianism, the less the chance of success.
(h) youth conflict: the greater the conflict between youth and elders, the less success.
(i) ideal conflict: the greater the conflict over ideals, the less success.
(j) ideal modification: the more is the ideology modified over time, the less success.
(k) adherence: the less adherence to the ideology, the less success.
(l) ethnic education: the less the young are educated into the sect lifestyle and ideology, the less success.
(m) compensation: the greater the chance of compensation, the less success.
(n) size: the greater the size of the colony, the less the chance of success.
(o) subdivision: the less is subdivision undertaken to reduce a colony’s size, the less success.
(p) harmony: the less that conflict exists with outsiders, the less success.
Although the characteristics of "initial poverty" and "practiced celibacy" do appear to distinguish the unsuccessful communal sects from the successful, they were not deemed worthy of being represented by hypotheses. Poverty was excluded because it occurred so many years before dissolution, and in both cases it was followed by prosperity. But it may be that a more stable, moderately prosperous economy is more conducive to success. Celibacy was ignored because it only existed for a portion of the histories of Zoar and Bishop Hill, and moreover, were in both cases more closely associated with "ideal modification." The longevity of the Shakers, who practiced celibacy, also makes one pause before citing the practice as a source of eventual failure. But here, too, it may yet be true.
The derived hypotheses above affirm the hypotheses of some theorists, but also point out glaring omissions. Kanter's suggestions concerning compensation, isolationism, and leader succession are upheld. The importance of "size" harkens back to Olson's discussion, though it is my belief that small communal sects must supply selective incentives as well as large ones — rather, small ones succeed because they are better able to supply some of the necessary incentives than the large colonies. Omitted in much of the substantive theorizing about communal sects is any discussion concerning conflict. Three of the above derived hypotheses concern internal or external conflict, and the last of these ("the less that conflict exists with outsiders, the less success") immediately brings a few of Coser‘s propositions to mind.
Ideologically, alternatives to the colony can be reduced by definition of other lifestyles as deviant or morally wrong, perhaps leading to damnation in the hereafter. And, of course, there are political ways to reduce a member's alternatives: threat of expulsion, or the less severe sanctions (e.g., brotherly admonishment); conflict with the external community; and physical isolation from settlements of the unbelievers.
The degree of success that a communal sect will enjoy therefore depends on the degree to which it is supplying benefits and reducing alternatives. To the degree that the ability to supply incentives or reduce alternatives is reduced, control over the member is lost.
The comparison of the successful with the unsuccessful communal sects has revealed a number of factors that potentially affect that ability:
(a) Ethnic education. The definitions of social reality -- the rightness of the communal life, the wrongness of rewards offered outside -- is reinforced by early and ongoing training.
(b) Leadership succession. This is especially a problem where authority is charismatic, for the leader is then closed associated with the ideology (as well as, perhaps, the polity), and when such a leader passes without a replacement a portion of the sects ideological benefits goes also.
(c) Economic viability, degree of economic dependence on the external society. Suffice it to say that a commune that is no longer viable cannot offer material security. Economic dependency on the outside can affect viability, as the fate of the community
will be determined by the fortunes or misfortunes of the external economy.
(d) Size of the colony, conscious limitation thereof. As the size of the community grows, the economic and political benefits obtained by any individual may be "watered down," making alternatives look better. Conscious limitation of the colony's size prevents this from occurring.
(e) Internal conflict between youth and elders, or over the choice of ideals. Extensive and deep-seated conflict that admits of no compromise may prove divisive.
(f) Modification of the ideology. The change of ideals is potentially hazardous, as many members may not regard the new goals as incentives.
(g) Degree of adherence to the ideology. If the number of members regarding the ideology and its elements as incentives for participation declines, the communal sect has lost some grounds for their compliance.
The list is likely incomplete, and the theory is not at all unique. Blau, in his discussion of power (1964:115-125), also mentions that compliance is the result of either dependence on rewards supplied or.negative sanctions (or both). The only difference may be that I have substituted the idea of "reduction of alternatives" for punishment and coercion. I prefer this because, for example, the definition of all other lifestyles as immoral is hard to perceive as being negative sanction; yet it is a subtle form of control, because the intent is to make the outer world less attractive.
Kanter's viewpoint must also be roughly similar to the view expounded here, for she, too, mentions such concepts as "incentives" and "alternatives"; moreover, her hypotheses concern processes (a) attaching one to the commune and (b) detaching one from other associations. We differ primarily in the ways we have dissected the two processes.
Of course, considering the limitations of the present analysis, I cannot say that my view is the better one. After all, only three communal sects were compared, and the given cases may be atypical. But if the value of this research lies not in the answers it provides, perhaps it will lie in the questions it raises.
Nordhoff's first hypothesis (9) suggests that the successful communal sect offers more security and moral satisfaction than the external society. While both security and moral satisfaction are subjective evaluations, the evidence appears to support it. Both Zoar and Bishop Hill were financially insecure when they disbanded, and both experienced a decline in the degree of adherence to the religion -- presumably a sign of moral dissatisfaction. The Hutterites, on the contrary, are generally economically secure, and adherence to the faith is said to be high.
His second hypothesis (10) is more suspect. All of the sects considered here experienced unbearable circumstances before their founding, but only one continues to survive.
William Hinds proposes (11) that the longevity of a commune is related to the proportion of individualistic ideals and practices existing in it. The association can occur because the values the definitions of rewarding objective phenomena are different, given communist or individualist ideology. In many instances they are even antithetical. This hypothesis seems fairly well supported. The outstanding feature in the waning years of Zoar and Bishop Hill was increasing individualism, while the Hutterites still do not face a revolt by individualists.
The two hypotheses rendered by Ralph Albertson appear to be valid. Referring to the first hypothesis (12), the evidence shows that the two more dictatorial communities, Zoar and Bishop Hill, had much shorter lives than the Hutterite communities, which strive to eliminate strong personalities. This may be because there are special, purposive rewards gained from association with a charismatic dictator, and once he is gone, those rewards can rarely be supplied by anyone else. The other hypothesis (13) declares that longevity depends on business ability. This certainly seems true. Both Zoar and Bishop Hill suffered an economic collapse prior to their dissolution: Zoar had not kept up with external technology and had an unfavorable balance of trade; Bishop Hill lost much of its finances through the effects of the Depression of 1857. The Hutterites, however, have kept abreast of technology and are economically secure. The continuance of material rewards seems to be important, too.
At present, the Faris hypothesis (14) suggesting the inevitability of assimilation is not wholly supported. While it is true that both Zoar and Bishop Hill were born out of conflict and died from conformity, the same has not yet proven true for the Hutterites, though it may. Identifying the sources of increasing assimilation is probably the more important problem. He suggests the disappearance of isolation as one source of assimilation, a matter already examined.
The more novel of Vollmer's hypotheses (15) does not appear to be upheld: the two communes where the membership was loyal more to the authority structure than the ideology were not the successful ones. Indeed, the converse seems true: The Hutterites enjoy success while emphasizing ideology over leadership.
Niebuhr's "denominalization thesis" (16), like Faris's hypothesis, is also denied by present evidence. Though the deaths of Zoar and Bishop Hill are associated with the second and third generations, the Hutterites have lived many generations past that. He may be correct in pointing out poor socialization as one "cause of death": in both Zoar and Bishop Hill the waning years were marked by increasing expressions of individualism. But he may yet be incorrect in suggesting that prosperity is a "cause" for the demise of communes, for Zoar and Bishop Hill met their ends amid financial calamity, while the Hutterites continue to enjoy a "comfortable" life (though the latter's wealth is depleted by continuous "branching").
Olson's two hypotheses have to be treated separately and with slightly different referents. The first hypothesis (17) suggests that the failure of the relatively small communal colonies we have examined need not be associated with a deficiency of "selective incentives." The facts seem to contradict this assertion. At Zoar people who were not full members could still obtain every privilege besides voting and holding office; moreover, they did not have to surrender all property to the community, as the full member did. Economic and ideological "selective" incentives were lacking as well: in the final stages the Zoarites found that the outer world could offer as much or more in the way of material and spiritual satisfaction. A similar realization came to the Jansonists of Bishop Hill after the death of their charismatic leader and the financial crisis of 1857. The Hutterite colonies, on the other hand, continue to offer their members the incentives of economic security and ideological distinction, as well as opportunities for political influence. Selective incentives seem to be just as vital to small groups as large.
To test Olson's second hypothesis (18), the comparison will be made between the Hutterite colonies, which grow no larger than 150 people, and the colonies of Zoar (300 members) and Bishop Hill (over 1,000 members). The hypothesis suggests that smaller groups are more likely to succeed, and the above figures would appear to bear this out.
Hypothesis (19) states a general view of theorists in the area of voluntary associations, i.e., the more gains a member receives, the more he/she will work for the group. Unfortunately, the data reflects organizational processes more closely than individual acts or perceptions. On the basis of what the organization was able to offer individuals, the hypothesis seems valid. For, as was mentioned above, the colonies that disbanded had fallen into times of declining economic viability and ideological distinctiveness.
A similarly individual-level hypothesis is expressed in (20): a member will work more for the group if he believes that getting benefits from the group depends on it. As we only have access to organizational-level data, we can only infer that the degree to which the organization makes benefits contingent on participation should be related to its success or failure. Once more we are plagued by incomplete information. All of the communal sects required the surrender of property to the community by all full members, so the successful colonies cannot be distinguished on these grounds. But, at least in Zoar, a novitiate received almost exactly the same rewards as a full member. This is not so in the Hutterite colonies, so this may affirm the supposition. Further affirmation may lie in the policies of compensation for defectors: Zoar and (eventually) Bishop Hill had liberal policies of compensation for those who left; at best guess, the Hutterites do not (but the data are lacking). In sum, there are reasons to believe that the unsuccessful colonies made less distinction between full members and others in regard to economic, political, and ideological benefits, and thus, reward was less contingent on full participation. But because of the methodological problems, this conclusion is a tenuous one.
Paraphrasing Clark and Wilson's hypothesis (21), failure of a communal sect can be related to a loss of (incentive) resources, specifically the loss of material, solidary, and purposive benefits. This claim is upheld fairly well by the evidence. The unsuccessful communes, Zoar and Bishop Hill, dissolved not long after they began to lose their economic viability and were therefore less able to supply material incentives. Too much of their financial resources were flowing to the external economy. Whether or not solidary or associative incentives were also increasingly, provided by the external society is harder to determine; in the case of Bishop Hill it is only a guess. It is probable, nonetheless, that the amount of solidary incentives existing within the colony was declining in the final years: both Zoar and Bishop Hill experienced dissension and declining observance of the faith, and that no doubt weakened social ties. The decline of the purposive incentives is also attested to by increasing dissension land declining observance of the faith. But for these groups, some of the purposive incentives may have been lost with the death of their leader as well. Needless to say, the majority of the Hutterite colonies have succeeded in maintaining material (economic), solidary (associative), and purposive (ideological) incentives, though occasionally facing difficulties in one or all of these spheres.
Evaluating the validity of hypotheses (22) and (23) requires first a judgment as to the degree to which group purposes are the chief motivators. In my opinion, communal sects do emphasize their purposes as grounds for motivation far more than the material or associative rewards that might be gained. Given this judgment, the former hypothesis predicts that the greatest disputation will be over group purposes. The cases seem to bear this out. Both Zoar and Bishop Hill experienced severe dissension shortly before dissolution: In Zoar, the conflict involved the ideals of communism and individualism; in Bishop Hill, the dissension erupted over the ideal of celibacy. There may be a connection between the degree of conflict over purposes and the viability of the colony. The latter hypothesis (23) adds only that the degree of conflict may be dependent on the degree of realization of ideals or disagreement over the choice of ideals. While none of the colonies suffered disruption because of failure to realize their goals, Zoar and Bishop Hill did experience divisive conflict in regard to the choice of ideals, citing again the disputations surrounding individualism at Zoar and celibacy at Bishop Hill. While Hutterites also have debates over policy, the issues are generally resolved through protracted discussion until a consensus is reached, or in some instances through "branching."
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
A close examination and comparison of the data for the three communal sects permits us to raise many hypotheses beyond the twenty-three treated above. The results of the comparison are shown in the Appendix. Abstracting from the differences between the successful and unsuccessful communal sects, we may tentatively derive the following hypotheses:
(a) economy: the less economically viable the colony becomes (perhaps following a period of prosperity), the less the chance of its success.
(b) dependency: the greater the dependency on the external economy, the less success.
(c) isolationism: the less isolationist is the colony, the less the chance of its success.
(d) communism: the less is communism part of the ideology, the the less success.
(e) charismatic leadership: the more is leadership based on charisma, the less the chance of success.
(f) leader succession: the less is the colony able to replace its leaders, the less the chance of success.
(g) democracy: the greater the authoritarianism, the less the chance of success.
(h) youth conflict: the greater the conflict between youth and elders, the less success.
(i) ideal conflict: the greater the conflict over ideals, the less success.
(j) ideal modification: the more is the ideology modified over time, the less success.
(k) adherence: the less adherence to the ideology, the less success.
(l) ethnic education: the less the young are educated into the sect lifestyle and ideology, the less success.
(m) compensation: the greater the chance of compensation, the less success.
(n) size: the greater the size of the colony, the less the chance of success.
(o) subdivision: the less is subdivision undertaken to reduce a colony’s size, the less success.
(p) harmony: the less that conflict exists with outsiders, the less success.
Although the characteristics of "initial poverty" and "practiced celibacy" do appear to distinguish the unsuccessful communal sects from the successful, they were not deemed worthy of being represented by hypotheses. Poverty was excluded because it occurred so many years before dissolution, and in both cases it was followed by prosperity. But it may be that a more stable, moderately prosperous economy is more conducive to success. Celibacy was ignored because it only existed for a portion of the histories of Zoar and Bishop Hill, and moreover, were in both cases more closely associated with "ideal modification." The longevity of the Shakers, who practiced celibacy, also makes one pause before citing the practice as a source of eventual failure. But here, too, it may yet be true.
The derived hypotheses above affirm the hypotheses of some theorists, but also point out glaring omissions. Kanter's suggestions concerning compensation, isolationism, and leader succession are upheld. The importance of "size" harkens back to Olson's discussion, though it is my belief that small communal sects must supply selective incentives as well as large ones — rather, small ones succeed because they are better able to supply some of the necessary incentives than the large colonies. Omitted in much of the substantive theorizing about communal sects is any discussion concerning conflict. Three of the above derived hypotheses concern internal or external conflict, and the last of these ("the less that conflict exists with outsiders, the less success") immediately brings a few of Coser‘s propositions to mind.
Ideologically, alternatives to the colony can be reduced by definition of other lifestyles as deviant or morally wrong, perhaps leading to damnation in the hereafter. And, of course, there are political ways to reduce a member's alternatives: threat of expulsion, or the less severe sanctions (e.g., brotherly admonishment); conflict with the external community; and physical isolation from settlements of the unbelievers.
The degree of success that a communal sect will enjoy therefore depends on the degree to which it is supplying benefits and reducing alternatives. To the degree that the ability to supply incentives or reduce alternatives is reduced, control over the member is lost.
The comparison of the successful with the unsuccessful communal sects has revealed a number of factors that potentially affect that ability:
(a) Ethnic education. The definitions of social reality -- the rightness of the communal life, the wrongness of rewards offered outside -- is reinforced by early and ongoing training.
(b) Leadership succession. This is especially a problem where authority is charismatic, for the leader is then closed associated with the ideology (as well as, perhaps, the polity), and when such a leader passes without a replacement a portion of the sects ideological benefits goes also.
(c) Economic viability, degree of economic dependence on the external society. Suffice it to say that a commune that is no longer viable cannot offer material security. Economic dependency on the outside can affect viability, as the fate of the community
will be determined by the fortunes or misfortunes of the external economy.
(d) Size of the colony, conscious limitation thereof. As the size of the community grows, the economic and political benefits obtained by any individual may be "watered down," making alternatives look better. Conscious limitation of the colony's size prevents this from occurring.
(e) Internal conflict between youth and elders, or over the choice of ideals. Extensive and deep-seated conflict that admits of no compromise may prove divisive.
(f) Modification of the ideology. The change of ideals is potentially hazardous, as many members may not regard the new goals as incentives.
(g) Degree of adherence to the ideology. If the number of members regarding the ideology and its elements as incentives for participation declines, the communal sect has lost some grounds for their compliance.
The list is likely incomplete, and the theory is not at all unique. Blau, in his discussion of power (1964:115-125), also mentions that compliance is the result of either dependence on rewards supplied or.negative sanctions (or both). The only difference may be that I have substituted the idea of "reduction of alternatives" for punishment and coercion. I prefer this because, for example, the definition of all other lifestyles as immoral is hard to perceive as being negative sanction; yet it is a subtle form of control, because the intent is to make the outer world less attractive.
Kanter's viewpoint must also be roughly similar to the view expounded here, for she, too, mentions such concepts as "incentives" and "alternatives"; moreover, her hypotheses concern processes (a) attaching one to the commune and (b) detaching one from other associations. We differ primarily in the ways we have dissected the two processes.
Of course, considering the limitations of the present analysis, I cannot say that my view is the better one. After all, only three communal sects were compared, and the given cases may be atypical. But if the value of this research lies not in the answers it provides, perhaps it will lie in the questions it raises.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Albertson, Ralph. 1936 "A Survey of Mutualistic Communities in America." Iowa Journal of Histogy and Politics, 34 (Oct.), pp 375-444.
Becker, Howard S. 1960 "Notes on the Concept of Commitment." American Journal of Sociology, 66 (July), pp. 32-40.
Blau, Peter M. 1964 Exchange and Power in Social Life. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Clark, Elmer T. 1937 The Small Sects in America. Nashville: Cokesbury Press.
Clark, Peter B. & James Q. Wilson. 1961 "Incentive Systems: a Theory of Organizations." Administrative Science Quarterly, 6 (Sept.), pp. 129-66
Collins, Randall. 1975 Conflict Sociology. New York: Academic Press, Inc.
Coser, Lewis A. 1956 The Functions of Social Conflict. New York: The Free Press.
Faris, Ellsworth. 1955 "The Sect and the Sectarian." American Journal of Sociology, 60 (May), pp. 75-89.
Heath, Anthony. 1976 Rational Choice and Social Exchange. New York :Cambridge University Press.
Homans, George Caspar. 1974 Social Behavior. Chicago: Harcourt Brace Javonovich, Inc.
Johnson, Benton. 1957 "A Critical Appraisal of the Church-Sect Typology." American Sociological Review, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 88-92.
Kanter, Rosabeth Moss. 1972. Commitment and Community. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
Oberschall, Anthony. Social Conflict and Social Movements. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Olson, Mancur. 1971. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press.
Turner, Jonathan H. 1974. The Structure of Sociological Theory. Homewood, Ill.: The
Dorsey Press.
Vollmer, Howard M. 1957. "Member Commitment and Organizational Competence in
Religious Orders." Berkeley Publications in Society and Institutions, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 13-36.
Warner, W. Keith and William D. Heffernan. 1967 “The Benefit-Participation
Contingency in Voluntary Farm 0rganizations." Rural Sociology, 32 (June), pp. 139-153.
Whitworth, John McKelvic. 1967. God's Blueprints. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Wilson, Bryan. 1970. Religious Sects. New York; McGraw-Hill Book Company;
BISHOP HILL
"Bishop Hill Colony." History of Henry County, Ill. Chicago: H. F. Kett & Co., 1877, pp. 145—151
Calverton, V. F. 1941 Where Angels Dared to Tread. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
Hinds, William Alfred. 1908 American Communities and Cooperative Colonies.
Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Company.
Mikkelsen, Michael A. 1892 "The Bishop Hill Colony." Johns Hopkins University
Studies in Historical and Political Science. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press.
Nordhoff, Charles. 1875 The Communistic Societies of the United States. New York;
Harper & Brothers, Publishers.
ZOAR
Hinds, William Alfred. American Communities and Cooperative Colonies. Chicago:
Charles H. Kerr & Company.
Landis, George B. 1898 "The Separatists of Zoar.“ Report of the American Historical Association. Washington: Government Printing Office.
Nordhoff, Charles. 1875 The Communistic Societies of the United States. New York:
Harper Brothers.
Randall, E.O. 1904 History of the Zoar Society. Columbus, Ohio: Press of Fred J. Heer.
HUTTERITES
Deets, Lee Emerson. 1975. The Hutterites. Philadelphia: Porcupine Press.
Eaton, Joseph W. 1952. "Controlled Acculturation: a Survival Technique of the Hutterites." American Sociological Review, 17 (June). pp- 331-340
Hinds, William Alfred. 1908. American Communities and Cooperative Colonies.
Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Company.
Holloway, Mark. 1951. Heavens on Earth. London: Turnstile Press.
Hostetler, John A. 1974. Hutterite Society. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.
Kephart, William M. 1976. Extraordinary Groups. New York: St. Martin's Press.
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