In the previous diary, "Evolution, Pragmatism and Progressivism,"
I offered what I saw as a foundation for a political philosophy
of Progressivism. It was based on ideas which had been steeping in my
mind for decades, after I received my M.A. in Sociology and left
academia. In today's diary I present what I see as the social science
behind that diary. If I fail in that, well, I would feel worse if I
never presented it at all.
As I indicated at the outset of "Evolution, Pragmatism and Progressivism," this theory is grounded in Evolutionary Psychology and Social Exchange Theory.
The basic premise is that the human brain is an organ which has evolved over millennia to calculate, on both conscious and older sub-conscious levels, the potential risks, costs and rewards of various behaviors. Association with other people has been a successful survival adaptation, but nature and social life continue to present problems, so we continue to calculate, consciously and subconsciously, the potential risks, costs and rewards of various social behaviors. In my view, the major premises of Social Exchange Theory are:
1. Social interaction of any kind involves a conscious or unconscious calculation of benefits and costs, or expected benefits and costs;
2. The benefits and costs being calculated include the material, such as money and imprisonment, and the non-material, such as honor and dishonor; and
3. The objective of this conscious or unconscious calculation is to manage benefits and costs so that benefits outweigh costs to the greatest extent possible.
I believe these principles apply all the way from the smallest social groups, such as families, to the largest, such as nation-states and multinational organizations. I'm not saying that everyone behaves rationally, nor that every behavior is purely rational. There are crazy people out there, and sometimes our emotions overrule our reasoning. But it's my observation that most people, most of the time, behave in ways which reflect such calculations.
So my major premise is that people act in groups on the basis of benefit/cost calculations. But what factors determine the complexity, evolution and duration of social groups? All kinds of answers have been proposed. Here are the factors which appear to me to be best-supported, along with the authors who proposed them.
FACTOR #1: USABLE RESOURCES
This is the factor most emphasized by Jared Diamond, in both Guns, Germs and Steel and Collapse. It's also a factor identified by Gerhard Lenski in his book, Ecological-Evolutionary Theory. Both Diamond and Lenski were considering fairly large social groups, so their attention was drawn to resources such as drinkable water, arable soil, climate, and available food sources. Diamond, in particular, demonstrates how a difference in the availability of such resources allowed Polynesians on one island to continue an agrarian lifestyle, while their former relatives on another island, with fewer resources, were compelled to resume hunting and gathering.
But I believe this factor can and should be generalized to include other resources potentially available to social groups, such as capital. There are many social groups, especially modern social groups, which do not directly engage in food production. But they still need resources -- such as capital -- in order to survive as a group.
The bottom line is this: if more usable resources are available to the social group, then more benefits can be available to the social group. In historical terms, a social group which lived in an area with drinkable water, good soil, a temperate climate, and edible grains and animals was able to obtain more food than a social group which did not. In modern terms, a group which has more capital can support itself better than a group which has less. With more resources at hand, the group can grow larger, and eventually develop more complexity.
But the amount of usable resources -- natural or capital -- can change over time. The climate can change drastically. Or you might use up a resource until you have no more. So, it is a factor which is both critical and variable. It bears watching. Perhaps a measure of "Gross Domestic Resources" is worth creating.
FACTOR #2: KNOWLEDGE
This is a factor upon which Lenski places particular emphasis. Well, he refers to it as "technology," and then defines "technology" as "information about the ways in which the resources of the environment may be used to satisfy human needs and desires." It's a critical factor, because the more practical information a social group acquires, the more benefits that social group can generate, economic and/or social. The group might learn how to grow more food, how to defend itself better, how to heal its sick, or how to create various arts. This is true whether we're talking about families or empires. Demographer Wolfgang Lutz reports that he has found "consistently positive and significant effects of educational attainment on economic growth" (p.294).
But the amount of knowledge acquired can differ from group to group, and it can also decline, as it did in Europe during its "Dark Ages."
What's the appropriate measure for this? My suggestion would be aggregate measures of educational attainment by group members.
FACTOR #3: POPULATION
Another critical factor identified by Lenski and Diamond is the number of people in the social group -- its population. With more members, the social group can increase its ability to acquire the resources and knowledge necessary to increase economic and social benefits for its members, which in turn permits the group to evolve more complex and specialized social exchanges. Exchanges between members of a small group are wholly personal; exchanges between members of a large group become less personal and more a function of position, class or caste. Of course, the size of a social group can also decline, due to things like disease, war, famine, or emigration -- or separation and divorce, in the case of families. In any case, a decline in the population will decrease the amount of social and/or economic benefits the group can generate.
Appropriate data are already collected by most countries in the form of a periodic census.
FACTOR #4: BENEFIT EXPECTATIONS
Lenski identifies "ideology," or belief system, as critical to a social group's development, because he associates the social group's "ideology" with how its members will calculate costs and benefits. Since these calculations involve uncertainties, I think it would be more accurate to say that a social group's "ideology," or belief system, is a factor which determines the cost and benefit expectations of its members.
The Amish give us a perfect example of this: based on their religious beliefs, members of this social group are expected to lead simple, humble lives, so they vastly restrict their purchase and use of modern amenities, such as cars, TVs and telephones. As a group, they don't have high benefit expectations. They are satisfied with the amount of benefits they can obtain by their traditional means. Their non-Amish neighbors, however, have higher benefit expectations. The non-Amish do expect to be able to enjoy the benefits of such amenities, even if they could technically survive without them. So, I would predict that the non-Amish would be likelier to increase their amount of practical knowledge, increase their usable resources, and increase their population. It's not because the Amish are less intelligent; it's because the Amish are satisfied with less.
Nevertheless, I prefer not to tie benefit expectations exclusively to a social group's ideology. First, some of the expected benefits of human association are universal. Everyone, regardless of ideology, needs food, drinkable water, and some form of shelter. These are basic "economic" needs. Furthermore, the vast majority of us find it necessary, for psychological and emotional reasons, to be around other people. We are generally social animals with certain basic social needs. Some social groups are based exclusively on such exchanges. Consequently, people who participate in groups will have certain basic benefit expectations in common, whether social or economic (or both), regardless of the group's ideology.
Additionally, it can be the case that people who share the same social group -- even the same family -- don't share the same ideology. The existence of different ideologies within the group can result in some different benefit expectations among its members. That can be a source of friction within the group, which forces the group eventually either to evolve or to rupture.
My hypothesis regarding this factor is that the more benefits the members of a social group expect, the more benefits they will try to obtain. Sociologist Peter M. Blau adds that the amount of benefits which group members are able to obtain becomes the standard for the amount of benefits which they expect (p.143-4). When members don't get the kind or quantity of benefits they expect, they will definitely make their disappointment known! Frustration of expectations leads to aggression. That is a long-established principle of psychology.
I'm guessing that data on benefit expectations will have to be gathered from periodic surveys of group members.
FACTOR #5: AVAILABLE BENEFITS, SOCIAL AND/OR ECONOMIC
The four previous factors enable a social group and its members to secure a quantity of economic and/or social benefits. The group's survival depends, first, on whether the quantity of economic and/or social benefits is enough to meet the basic expectations of its members. If it isn't, the group will collapse, partially or wholly.
But the group may be in a situation where its usable resources, knowledge, population and benefit expectations combine to yield more than enough to meet its members' basic needs. If that is the case, the group will be able to grow in population, acquire more knowledge, and develop more usable resources. Benefit expectations will likely increase, as well, creating a "feedback loop."
Of course, a group which has enjoyed a surplus can later experience an event which causes the group to lose resources, population and benefits. Wars, epidemics and droughts can have that effect.
Measures of a group's pool of economic benefits might include data concerning total assets held, or GDPs for nation-states.
Measures of a group's pool of social benefits might include rates of member interaction and voluntary participation in group activities.
FACTOR #6: EFFECTIVENESS OF THE POLITICAL ARRANGEMENT AT SECURING SOCIAL AND/OR ECONOMIC BENEFITS FOR GROUP MEMBERS
In small groups, political roles are informal. There is no need for formal administration, since everyone has a personal relationship with everyone else, and there may not be enough of an economic surplus to permit any members to assume formal, full-time administrative roles.
However, as groups increase in size, and in their capacity to exceed basic expectations, they do become able to support formal, full-time administrative roles. At that point, formal political arrangements -- governments -- arise and assume responsibility for ensuring that the expected economic and/or social benefits are secured for group members. The size and complexity of the political arrangement increases and evolves along with the group.
Of course, a group may grow in population, have specialized roles, develop a political arrangement, and then experience an event which causes the group to lose resources, population and benefits.
My contention is that, to be effective, the leaders in the political arrangement need to:
(1) pay attention to increases and decreases of the four primary factors, as well as increases and decreases in the benefits being received by members of the group; and
(2) undertake pragmatic actions calculated to ensure that group members receive the benefits they currently expect.
As I see it, the fate of the political arrangement, and possibly the group's survival, depends on the degree to which the group meets the benefit expectations of its members. If member expectations are NOT met, then members will be frustrated and either fight the political arrangement or flee. The degree to which they fight or flee will depend in part on the degree to which their benefit expectations are not met, and in part on their numbers within the population. I'm sure there are other variables, as well, and I hope to address some of them in a future diary.
Typical measures of the political arrangement's effectiveness have included things like wealth surpluses, credit ratings and membership figures. I think measures of ineffectiveness would include the quantity, size and forcefulness of member protests directed against the political arrangement, as well as emigration.
THE TEMPLE OF ESET
As I developed a mental picture of the interaction of these factors,
the facade of a greco-roman temple came to mind. It's a temple with
four pillars: "Usable Resources;" "Knowledge;" "Population," and
"Benefit Expectations." The four pillars work in combination to support
the lintel, i.e., "Benefits, Social and/or Economic ." And resting
upon the lintel is the crown, i.e., the "Political Arrangement for
Securing Expected Benefits."
Such is my current theory of social organization, subject to any change that evidence requires. I hope it's useful for others, but I can only say it works for me.
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